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SOCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: CREATING A MORE RESPONSIBLE WEB THROUGH PORTABLE 
IDENTITY, CROSS-WEB REPUTATION, AND CODE-BACKED NORMS  
 
Daniel H. Kahn1 
Currently, our identities are scattered across the Web.  At each 
website on which we participate, we must create new user names, personal 
profiles, social connections, and histories of activity.  Without portable 
identities, we cannot fully reap the benefits of the emerging reputation 
economy.  Moreover, because of the Web’s structural limitations on 
identity, norm-based social governance has not played a significant role on 
most sites.  The paucity of norms has created an atmosphere in which 
abusive behavior is common, heightening the apparent need for new legal 
regulation.   
 
 However, new tools, which I term social intermediaries, are poised 
to introduce portable identity to the Web.  By allowing users to aggregate 
records of their activities across multiple sites, these tools increase 
reputation-based incentives for production.  They also promote an 
atmosphere of respect by encouraging people to recognize each other as 
fully rounded individuals.  Most importantly, they will allow many more 
sites to offer opportunities for users to govern each other through code-
backed norms.  This new opportunity for bottom-up social governance 
will help responsible users and site operators ameliorate the problems of 
abusive behavior on the Web.  While social intermediaries introduce new 
regulatory challenges, their norm-building capacity shows that law is not 
the only answer to the Web’s social problems. 
                                                
1  Law clerk to Judge James Robertson, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; 
Harvard Law School Post-Graduate Research Fellow.  J.D. cum laude, Harvard Law School 
2008; B.A. with Honors in Political Science, Yale College 2005.  Thank you to Jonathan Zittrain 
for his invaluable assistance. 







 When engineers designed what would eventually become the Internet, they chose 
not to build a system of identification into the inner workings of the network.2  Their 
choice remains the status quo today:  while Internet users must regularly provide various 
forms of self-identification to engage with websites, email clients, and other sources of 
online content, the infrastructure layers at the core of the Internet have no system to 
correlate identity to action.3  As a result, there is not any centralized system to transport 
information about our identities between sites on the World Wide Web.4    
 Until recently, this proved to be an impassible barrier for identity; each site that 
allows participation has been forced to maintain its own user-identification system.  
Similarly, without portable identities on the Web, we must build new self-representations 
at each site on which we participate.5  The self-descriptions, social connections, and 
histories of activity we develop on these sites are in a very real sense our Web “selves.”  
The ability to construct multiple Web selves undoubtedly facilitates expression and can 
protect privacy.  However, the absence of infrastructure to transport identity information 
means that we have to develop our identities anew at each site on which we participate, 
even if we might wish to employ a unified identity across multiple sites.  
                                                
2  See Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It 31–33 (2008); 
David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey, Jr., The Accountable Internet: Peer 
Production of Internet Governance, 9 Va. J. L. & Tech. 9, ¶ 82 (2004), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue3/v9i3_a09-Palfrey.pdf.  This choice is one manifestation of the 
“end-to-end” principle around which the Internet was designed.  See Zittrain, supra, at 31–33.   
3  Engineers describe the Internet as consisting of several conceptual “layers” of network 
architecture.  See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 2, at 67–69; Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The 
Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law 3 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Pub. Law 
and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 55, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=416263.  
While the exact characterizations vary, I will use the following (extremely simplified) model:  (1) 
the “infrastructure” layers, through which data is transmitted; (2) the “application” layer, which 
represents the software that facilitates individual tasks; (3) the “content” layer, which comprises 
the actual information exchanged by users; and (4) the “social” layer, which describes the human 
interaction that overlays data exchange.  What I term the infrastructure layers are typically 
described separately and include both hardware and software components.  See, e.g., id. at 3. 
4  The Web and the Internet are not synonyms.  The Web is only a subset of the Internet. 
The latter also includes functions like Internet gaming and non-Web-based email. See Preston 
Gralla, How the Internet Works 116 (4th ed. 1998).  I focus on the Web specifically, rather than 
the entire Internet. 
5  See Joseph Smarr, Plaxo, Google I/O 2008: OpenSocial, OpenID, and OAuth: Oh, My! 
(June 9, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SYnlH5FXz0 (discussing the difficulty of 
transferring personal data between sites and stating “every single site acts like you’ve never used 
another website before in your life”); Pluck, White Paper: Social Bridging 1–3 (2010), 
http://www.pluck.com/learn/Pluck_Social_Bridging.pdf  (analogizing the Web to a series of 
“islands” of isolated socializing). 




 In this Article, I explain how this disaggregation of identity harms Web users.  
First, it hinders participation in the emerging reputation economy.  Second, it has 
rendered most sites inhospitable to bottom-up norm-driven governance.6  Not 
surprisingly, the absence of constraining social forces has resulted in a flood of abusive 
behavior.7   
 Yet a new era of cross-Web identity is dawning.  A few legal scholars have 
suggested that portable identity should be made possible through legal mandates8 or 
through changes to the Internet’s infrastructure layers.9  However, I explain that new 
repositories of identity and reputational data are emerging at the Web’s application 
layer.10  These repositories, which I term “social intermediaries,” are the cross-Web 
successors to social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and LinkedIn.11    
 Most of the handful of legal academic writers who have mentioned social 
intermediaries thus far have done so only in passing.12  These authors, and those who 
                                                
6  See infra Part IV.B–C.   
7  See infra Part III.A.  Danielle Citron offers an excellent and disturbing primer on these 
concerns.  See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61 (2009). 
8  See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. Colloquy 1, 6–7 (2008), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/25/LRColl2008n25Picker.pdf; see 
also Lilian Edwards & Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networking: Irreconcilable Ideas?, 
in Harboring Data: Information Security, Law, and the Corporation 226-27 (Andrea Matwyshyn 
ed., 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148732 (suggesting value of legal protections 
for portable identity, but ultimately advocating “wait and see” approach). 
9  See Johnson et al., supra note 2 at ¶¶ 39-43 and 82-83 (suggesting that we may move 
voluntarily towards small networks built around portable identity that will eventually re-form into 
a new Internet); see also Ken D. Kumayama, Note, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 
427, 445-46, 462-63 (2009) (mentioning benefits of, but not explicitly advocating, architectural 
changes creating a new “identity layer” that would permit cross-Web pseudonymity). 
10  Social intermediaries are not verified identity systems, in which people must prove via 
credit cards or other means that they are who they claim to be.  None of the tools I describe 
demand up-front proof of honesty in self-identification.  See infra Part V.A. 
11  See id.  
12  See Jeffrey Aresty, Digital Identity and the Lawyer’s Role in Furthering Trusted Online 
Communities, 38 U. Tol. L. Rev. 137, 149 (2006); Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, 
Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and 
Disseminating an Individual’s Image Over the Internet, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 313, 339–40 
(2009); Molly Beutz Land, Networked Activism, 22 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 205, 237 (2009); Viktor 
Mayer-Schonberger, Virtual Heisenberg: The Limits of Virtual World Regulability, 66 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 1245, 1260 (2009); William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in 
Social Marketing, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1105, 1121, 1161–62 (2009); Jane K. Winn, Globalization 
and Standards: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 5 J.L. & Pol’y for Info. Soc’y 185, 205 (2009).  
James Grimmelmann offers more meaningful analysis.  See James Grimmelmann, Saving 




ignore social intermediaries entirely, have vastly underestimated their importance and 
value for social ordering on the Web.  Software developer Joseph Smarr states that social 
intermediaries are driving a transformation “as fundamental as the birth of the Web 
itself”:  the transformation to the “Social Web,” meaning a move toward human 
interaction playing a more central role in Web use.13  In this Article, I contend that social 
intermediaries will enable us to develop and deploy positive reputations across the Web, 
increasing the incentives to engage in socially valued behavior.  Similarly, I argue that 
social intermediaries will promote a culture of respect by allowing Web users to 
recognize each other as rounded individuals worthy of respect and by exposing 
individuals to alternative points of view. 
 Most importantly, I argue that social intermediaries will decrease abusive 
behavior on the Web by facilitating norm development.  Jonathan Zittrain expresses hope 
that innovative software can facilitate the development of “code-backed norms.”14  
Similarly, Lior Strahilevitz writes of the possibility of “us[ing] technology to transform 
loose-knit environments, where reputation often fails to constrain antisocial behavior, 
into close-knit environments, where reputation constrains misbehavior more 
effectively.”15  Social intermediaries, I contend, are the technology to bring that 
transformation to the Web.16  While the emerging Social Web creates new regulatory 
challenges, it also invites re-examination of calls for regulation that are premised on the 
absence of constraining social forces. 
 In late April 2010, Facebook brought the budding world of social intermediaries 
to the forefront for many of its users.  With Facebook’s newly introduced “Open Graph,” 
users can employ the names and identity information contained in their Facebook 
accounts on numerous websites, allowing those sites to offer “instant personalization” of 
their features.17  Existing Facebook users who sign in to Facebook and then visit 
                                                                                                                                            
Facebook, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1137, 1148, 1192–95 (2009). 
13  Joseph Smarr, Plaxo, Google I/O 2009: The Social Web: An Implementer’s Guide (June 
1, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juIko_o2ZWg.   
14  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 223–28. 
15  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone (and Everything?), 81 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1699, 1699 (2006). 
16  While I will discuss legal issues, my primary focus is on informal methods of 
governance.  Cf. Jerry Kang, Cyber Race, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1137–38 (2000) (focusing, in 
a discussion of racism and the Internet, primarily on social change rather than legal reform).   
17  See Posting of Alex Iskold to ReadWriteWeb, Facebook Open Graph: The Definitive 
Guide for Publishers, Users and Competitors, 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebook_open_graph_the_definitive_guide_for_publish
ers_users_and_competitors.php (Apr. 23, 2010, 10:50 EST); Posting of Erick Schonfeld to 
TechCrunch, Zuckerberg: “We Are Building a Web Where the Default is Social”, 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/21/zuckerbergs-buildin-web-default-social (Apr. 21, 2010).  
Facebook also has called its system simply “Facebook for Websites.”  See Facebook, Facebook 
for Websites, http://developers.facebook.com/docs/guides/web (last visited May 5, 2010).  




participating third-party sites retain their Facebook identities by default, and they must 
actively “opt out” to avoid using Facebook’s social intermediary features.18  Whether 
intentionally or unwittingly, many Web users have had their first taste of portable identity 
and cross-Web social features via Facebook’s new system.   
 Many users and even several U.S. Senators have criticized Facebook’s Open 
Graph as a threat to privacy.19  More generally, several legal scholars have implied that 
all social intermediaries threaten privacy.20  Given the increased attention Facebook’s 
recent changes have drawn to the issue, more discussion of social intermediaries’ impact 
on privacy is surely forthcoming.  I believe this is an important and worthwhile 
discussion, but privacy is not my focus here.  My goal, instead, is to explore the under-
appreciated and unique socio-legal benefits of social intermediaries.  As privacy scholar 
Daniel Solove explains, there is a tension between reputation and responsibility, on the 
one hand, and privacy on the other.21  This article focuses on the responsibility side of the 
                                                
18  See Facebook, supra note 17; Posting of Christina Warren to Mashable, Facebook 
Open Graph: What it Means for Privacy, http://mashable.com/2010/04/21/open-graph-privacy 
(Apr. 21, 2010).   
19  See Letter from Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator, et al., to Mark Zuckerberg, 
Facebook CEO, Apr. 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/36406.html (criticizing “instant personalization” opt-
out and encouraging Federal Trade Commission scrutiny); see also, e.g., Moveon.org, Petition: 
Facebook, Respect My Privacy!, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=114387775262356 
(last visited June 15, 2010) (presenting Facebook with petition with over 190,000 members 
asking to reverse its recent privacy policy changes).  In response to the criticism, Facebook 
introduced simpler privacy controls, though it retained its opt-out policy.  See Posting of Mark 
Zuckerberg to The Facebook Blog, Making Control Simple,  
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=391922327130 (May 26, 2010, 10:55 EST). 
20  See Blackman, supra note 12, at 339–40 (2009) (mentioning Facebook Connect as 
opening personal profile data to search engines in the context of a discussion highlighting new 
tools for “omniveillance”); McGeveran, supra note 12, at 1121, 1161-62 (discussing Facebook 
Connect and other portable identity software as potential new tools for social marketing, about 
which the author expresses privacy concerns).  James Grimmelmann offers the most detailed and 
focused discussion of social intermediaries and privacy, arguing that portable identity threatens 
personal privacy by exposing personal data to unsecured websites.  See Grimmelmann, supra 
note 12, at 1148 & n.53 (2009) (“If you asked me to pick the next Facebook feature to cause a 
massive privacy implosion, I’d guess Connect.”); id. at 1192–95 (suggesting that “we should [] be 
extremely cautious about technical infrastructures for social network portability, like Google’s 
OpenSocial, and APIs from MySpace and Facebook”).  Note that “Facebook Connect” is the 
name for Facebook’s earlier, slightly more privacy-protective social intermediary system, which 
was superseded by Open Graph.  See Posting of Ben Parr to Mashable, Facebook to Kill 
Facebook Connect, http://mashable.com/2010/04/21/facebook-kills-facebook-connect (Apr. 21, 
2010). 
21  See Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the 
Internet 31–32 (2007), available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/Future-of-
Reputation. 




equation; its aim is to state the strongest case for social intermediaries as tools to 
empower Web users to govern themselves.  While I recognize the importance of privacy, 
it is beyond the scope of this Article to weigh the benefits of social intermediaries against 
their potential privacy dangers.22 
 In Part II, I describe how identity and reputation are scattered on the non-
intermediated Web.23  In Part III, I examine leading problems at the Web’s social layer, 
why site operators lack the incentives and tools to remedy them, and solutions proposed 
by legal scholars.  In Part IV, I discuss norms as a strategy for governance, looking 
particularly at how some popular websites have used code-based norms successfully and 
why they have not taken hold on the Web at large.  In Part V, I introduce social 
intermediaries, including both the backbone software for portable identity as well as user-
facing tools like Facebook Open Graph and Google Friend Connect.  In Part VI, I 
contend that portable identity and reputation will open the reputation economy to 
everyone and forward important legal values.  In Part VII, I argue that social 
intermediaries will bring a new era of norm-based governance to the Web.  In Part VIII, I 
look at some of the new challenges social intermediaries may introduce, including 
increased development of antisocial norms, new opportunities for invidious 
discrimination online, and over-enforcement of norms.  In Part IX, I conclude that we 
should be guardedly optimistic about the growth of norms on the Social Web and that we 




II. IDENTITY AND REPUTATION ON THE NON-INTERMEDATED WEB 
 
 Countering prevalent “Wild West” imagery, Alfred C. Yen argues that the 
Internet is best analogized to feudal Europe.24  While Yen focuses his analogy on domain 
names, ISP control of user activity, and copyright issues, his metaphor is also a good 
starting point for our understanding of identity and reputation on the non-intermediated 
Web.  Just as feudal European kingdoms were fragmented into small and self-sufficient 
fiefs,25 each website among the multitudes must maintain its own identity and reputation 
regime.  This Part first explores how identity is confined to individual websites. It then 
                                                
22  The balance between privacy and responsibility must be struck at two levels—by 
individual users who choose whether and how to participate on social intermediaries, and by 
governing bodies, which may limit the outer bounds for social intermediaries’ relationship with 
their users.  Additionally, the weight of privacy threats may vary between social intermediary 
services, which may adopt more or less privacy-protecting systems and policies. 
23  By “non-intermediated Web,” I mean the Web in the absence of social intermediaries.  It 
describes both the historical period up until recently in which portable identity was unavailable 
and those portions of the Web today in which social intermediaries have not yet been adopted.   
24  See generally Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and 
Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1207 (2002). 
25  See id. at 1232–36. 




examines how that isolation locks average users out of the “Reputation Economy.” 
 
 
A. Scattered Identities and Reputations 
 
 Our Web identities and reputations are isolated into single-site containers.  Most 
Web 2.0 sites26 demand that we “log in” at the threshold of interactivity.  If we wish to 
participate on a website, we must first create an account, typically consisting of a “user 
name” and password, to tie our actions to a persona.27  We typically must create such new 
accounts at each separate site we use.28  Even if an individual employs the same user 
name on multiple websites, it is unlikely that the name will be recognized by others from 
site to site given the massive number of Web participants.29  Moreover, even if I happen 
to recognize a name on one site from its use on another, I cannot be certain the two 
names represent the same person.30  “ABC123” on YouTube may not be “ABC123” on a 
Yahoo! forum. 
 Representing ourselves in our accounts with our “real names” and accurate 
photographs of ourselves cannot fully overcome this problem.  Because instances of 
identity misrepresentation are common online,31 even if we happen to recognize what 
appears to be the same user across multiple sites, we can rarely be sure that people are 
telling the truth about who they are.  For instance, a trend developed in which the popular 
micro-blogging service Twitter became host to numerous impersonated celebrity 
accounts.32 
                                                
26  Web 2.0 sites are sites such as Flickr and YouTube that rely primarily on user-generated 
content.  See Brandon Brown, Note, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the DMCA in a 
Web 2.0 World, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 437, 437 (2008).   
27  I use the term “account” to describe the basic credentials, such as a user name, an email 
address, and a graphic icon, by which users symbolize themselves to other users and to websites.  
In contrast, I use the term “identity” to mean “who a person is,” more broadly.  Unless otherwise 
noted, my use of “identity” can refer to either realistic online representations of offline self or 
more fanciful online self-representations. 
28  The situation is different on certain smaller networks of affiliated sites.  For instance, an 
individual might use the same commenter name on the various Gawker Media blogs or on the 
various blogs hosted by LiveJournal. 
29  One source estimates that as of December 2009, over 1.7 billion people worldwide use 
the Internet in some fashion.  See Internet World Stats, The Internet Big Picture: World Internet 
Users and Population Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010). 
30  See Smarr, supra note 5. 
31  See, e.g., Solove, supra note 21, at 141 (describing impersonated legal celebrities).   
32  See Don Reisinger, Top 10 Twitter Celebs: Real or Fake?, CNET News, Apr. 15, 2009, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-10218926-2.html; Associated Press, La Russa, Twitter 




 Agency is therefore veiled; it is impossible to assert a single cross-Web identity 
reliably.  Instead, our identities on the Web are radically disaggregated.33  Moreover, we 
do not have any easy and reliable way to carry information about our hobbies, our 
personal relationships, or others’ impressions of us from site to site.  While many sites 
allow us to create personal profiles, these profiles do not make it simple for us to 
amalgamate information across sites.  We also cannot easily transport information about 
our activity on one site onto another site.  For instance, my profile on StubHub, a sports 
ticket resale site, does not tell users about the comments I have left in the hockey forums 
on ESPN.com.  I might place a link on one site to my actions on the other, but this 
approach has limits.  First, as discussed above, I could act deceptively.  Second, this ad 
hoc method of linking cross-site activity does not scale; it might work to cross-link 
activities on a handful of sites, but not on a hundred.34  In sum, on the non-intermediated 
Web, we have not had any “central banks” for identity or infrastructure to transport the 
personalities and reputation-building information we wish to compile.35 
 
 
B. Cross-Web Isolation and the Reputation Economy 
 
 The term “reputation economy” has been used with two related meanings.  First, 
it signifies that positive reputation can fuel economic gain.36  This idea of reputation-as-
means is captured by the common social science metaphor “social capital,” used to 
illustrate that positive reputation and personal relationships have value, just like 
                                                                                                                                            
Settle Lawsuit (June 5, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4235409 (describing 
baseball manager Tony La Russa’s settled lawsuit against Twitter over a user pretending to be 
him).  In response to these problems, Twitter began verifying the identities of its most famous 
users.  See Posting of Pete Cashmore to Mashable, Twitter Launches Verified Accounts, 
http://mashable.com/2009/06/11/twitter-verified-accounts-2 (Jun. 11, 2009).  However, this 
solution is not available to all users.  See Twitter, Verified Account, 
http://twitter.com/help/verified (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).  Moreover, there is no reason to 
assume all sites will be as responsible as Twitter or have the resources to verify the offline 
identities of its users. 
33  Danielle Citron uses the term “disaggregat[ion]” to describe the separation between 
individuals’ offline identities and their online personas.  See Citron, supra note 7, at 63.  While 
the online/offline disaggregation highlighted by Citron is undoubtedly important, it is online 
identities themselves that are far more scattered and “disaggregated.”   
34  See Smarr, supra note 5. 
35  By “reputation,” I mean third-party impressions of persons.  See Oxford English 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (2nd def.) (defining reputation as “[t]he common or general estimate of 
a person with respect to character or other qualities . . . .”).  By “reputational data,” “reputation-
building data,” and “reputational information,” I use the accumulated information commonly 
used to build those third-party impressions. 
36  See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More 
76 (2006) (“Measured by the amount of attention a product attracts, reputation can be converted 
into other things of value: jobs, tenure, audiences, and lucrative offers of all sorts.”). 




conventional capital.37  Attention is a scarce resource, and whoever captures it can gain in 
the reputation economy.38  Second, “reputation economy” signifies that people compete 
for renown alone without regard for potential economic gain.  For instance, open-source 
advocates explain how programmers are motivated to develop software for free by the 
possibility of increased esteem among fellow programmers.39  Similarly, in his article 
advocating the adjustment of copyright law to give attribution a more prominent role, 
Greg Lastowka explores how software coders, fan-fiction authors, law professors, and 
French chefs all work to build reputations even though their behavior is not closely 
correlated with economic gain.40 
 Chris Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine, touted the benefits of the 
emerging reputation economy during an interview with news satirist Stephen Colbert.41  
Anderson told Colbert that, while the possibility of monetizing reputation had always 
existed, “now that we’re doing everything online,” we are seeing the rise of “huge global 
reputation economies.”42  As an example of using the Internet to build reputation, 
Anderson told Colbert that he had 13,649 “followers” on Twitter who could read his 
updates regularly.43  Colbert, in character as an egomaniac, responded, “Bite it!  I’ve got 
half a million [followers]!  Now, in the reputation economy, I’m way richer than you, 
                                                
37  See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community 19–24 (2000) (explaining the concept of social capital); Nicole B. Ellison et al., The 
Benefits of Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social 
Network Sites, 12 J. Computer-Mediated Comm., iss. 4, art. 1 (2007), available at 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue4/ellison.html (summarizing research on benefits of social 
capital).  More specifically, Chris Anderson refers to “reputation credits” or “attention credits.”  
See Anderson, supra note 36, at 21, 163; see also Cory Doctorow, Down and Out in the Magic 
Kingdom (2003), available at http://craphound.com/down/download.php (describing a fictional 
post-scarcity society in which reputation is represented by a form of currency called the 
“whuffie”). 
38  See Anderson, supra note 36, at 211; Picker, supra note 8, at 4 (“With the ready ability 
[online] to match advertising with content, a platform that generates pageviews is a valuable 
media property.”). 
39  See Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open 
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary 79–136 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, 
Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369, 426–34 (2002).  
40  See Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. 
Rev. 41, 59–62 (2007). 
41  See The Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast July 22, 2009), available 
at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/239500/july-22-2009/chris-anderson. 
42  See id. 
43  See id. 




right?”44   
 Colbert is right, of course.  Success in the reputation economy, whether defined in 
terms of monetary income or other more intrinsic rewards, rests in significant part on the 
level of attention we receive for our work.  If our efforts to gain attention succeed, we 
might be able to sell advertising, grow in esteem among our peers, earn tenure, or feel 
pride in our success.  The ability to garner attention turns on many factors, including 
talent, luck, and effort.  Yet without an easy method to tie our works together or the 
reliable ability to clearly proclaim them as our own, it is difficult to build the kind of 
track record of quality that can draw consistent attention. 
 The Web should create a level playing field in which everyone can compete with 
Stephen Colbert the television star and Chris Anderson the magazine editor for 
“reputation riches.”  And to a significant extent, it has—but the revolution is not 
complete.  Offline, there are pragmatic limits on the ability of reputation to scale—for 
instance, we can only remember a limited number of people.  Online, software could 
overcome this limitation by providing potentially unlimited digital databases of 
reputational information.  However, on the non-intermediated Web, we cannot easily 
amalgamate our online activities to achieve cross-Web recognition.   
 For those who seek Web-based “reputation riches,” the main barrier to success is 
the difficulty in building trust.  The threat of imitation and identity theft always looms.  
David Johnson, Susan Crawford, and John Palfrey underline this problem when they 
criticize the failure to build identity into the Internet’s infrastructure layers.45  They write 
that the lack of identity online “runs counter to the most fundamental needs of our social 
systems” because “[w]e cannot trust each other unless we know whom we are trusting.”46  
A celebrity like Colbert can survive imitators thanks to his ability to draw attention to his 
real activity (Colbert himself has had over a dozen Twitter imitators, including one who 
accrued over 350,000 followers, competing with his real account).47  Those who do not 
have access to especially trusted media sources (whether in traditional media or online) 
cannot overcome deception so easily.48  While the Web is often described as 
“democratizing fame,”49 the tenuous nature of identity online means that the playing field 
                                                
44  See id. 
45  See Johnson et al., supra note 2, at ¶ 83. 
46  Id. 
47  See Reisinger, supra note 32; see also Stephen Colbert on Twitter, 
http://twitter.com/stephencolbert (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (most popular fake); Stephen on 
Twitter, http://twitter.com/stephenathome (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (real).   
48  Cf. Citron, supra note 7, at 104 (suggesting that defamation cannot be cured through 
self-help because some people will not see the victim’s response or believe it). 
49  See, e.g., Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 Harv. 
J.L. & Tech. 1, 29 (2007); Lakshmi Chaudhry, Mirror, Mirror on the Web, available at The 
Nation, Jan. 29, 2007, at 19, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070129/chaudry; Sarah Hinchliff, 
Privacy and the Democratization of Fame, Stanford Center for Internet and Society, July 9, 2009, 




is not so level as the phrase suggests.   
 It is not only the would-be famous who suffer from the difficulty in amalgamating 
reputational information across websites.  Sellers on eBay who have positive, established 
reputations on the site can sell at a premium compared to those who lack such 
reputations.50  Yet Web users who have proven reliable transactors on one site cannot 
readily leverage their reputations in order to gain premiums on another site.  Similarly, a 
user who builds a strong track record of quality comments on one site cannot easily point 
to that history in attempting to establish credibility on another site.  As Danielle Citron 
notes, “[a]n individual must establish an online presence and begin to build an online 
reputation before aggregating ideas or economic opportunities with others online.”51  
Without reliable account interconnection, establishing a meaningful presence is 
especially difficult for relatively casual, low-output Web users.   
 Moreover, content consumers are also harmed by reputation isolation.  People 
often know nothing about the sources of information they consume on the Web.  This 
lack of source information can lead to abuses.  For instance, “astroturfing” refers to the 
common phenomenon of a small number of individuals or a commercial or political 
entity pretending to represent a broad-based “grassroots” movement.52  The lack of 
identity information available about the “astroturfers” enables the deception.   
 To restate, most Web users do not have full access to the reputation economy.  
The majority of people cannot readily build recognizable cross-Web reputations.  The 
few who succeed in gaining especially great popularity might reach the point where their 
names are recognized across multiple sites.  Even these lucky and diligent few run the 
risk of impersonation and identity theft.  The analogy of social capital reveals the 
inefficiency of reputation isolation. 
  
 
III. PROBLEMS AT THE WEB’S SOCIAL LAYER  
 
 This Part looks at the growing problems at the Web’s social layer in order to 
examine the sphere in which the solutions offered by social intermediaries would operate.  
First, it summarizes the growing concerns about corrosive behavior on the Web.  Next, it 
shows that site operators lack legal incentives to prevent abusive behavior.  It also 
explains that even if liability for third-party content were expanded, moderation is often 
too time-consuming and difficult for individual site operators to undertake.  Finally, it 
explores various approaches proposed by legal scholars to these difficult problems. 
                                                                                                                                            
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6220. 
50  See Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 457, 471 
(2001); Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Reputation in an Internet Auction 
Model, http://ssrn.com/abstract=207448 (Jan. 25, 2000); see also infra notes 141-145 (describing 
eBay’s reputation system). 
51  Citron, supra note 7, at 68. 
52  See Wikipedia, Astroturfing, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astroturfing (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010). 






A. Social-Layer Problems 
 
 While Web 2.0 functionality allows new opportunities for user participation, it 
also expands opportunities for negative user behavior.53  Such behavior is illustrated in 
the jargon of Internet culture:  a “troll” refers to someone who intentionally engages in 
disruptive behavior characterized by abusiveness to other Web users;54 “flaming” is the 
practice of excoriating another user, and a “flam[e] war” occurs when two or more users 
flame each other repeatedly.55  Danielle Citron and other scholars have highlighted the 
frequency of defamatory, harassing, threatening, and other hateful communications on 
the Web.56  The harms flowing from abusive speech on the Web are often greater than 
those from abusive speech offline because Web postings can reach anyone in the world, 
can last forever, and can be repeated easily.  Citron refers to the ability of swarms of 
users to forward messages rapidly as the “aggregating” nature of the Internet.57 
 The Web has been praised as a place where people can communicate without 
being judged by physical characteristics.58  Contrary to this idealized vision, Citron 
shows that groups such as women and minorities that have been traditional targets of 
discrimination offline have been singled out as targets of abusive behavior on the Web as 
well.59  For instance, she documents how an anonymous mob wrote harassing blog posts 
and emails directed to programmer and technology blogger Kathy Sierra, including death 
                                                
53  Characterizing threatening online communications in the First Amendment 
action/expression rubric poses challenges.  See Citron, supra note 7, at 100–01.  By using the 
term “behavior,” I do not mean to endorse any particular view. 
54  See Mattathias Schwartz, Malwebolence, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2008, (Magazine), at 24 
(“In the late 1980s, Internet users adopted the word ‘troll’ to denote someone who intentionally 
disrupts online communities.”).   
55  See Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation and Free 
Expression on the Internet, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 519, 520 (2006). 
56  See, e.g., Citron, supra note 7, at 64–66, 69–81 (collecting stories and sources of 
statistics); Shira Auerbach, Note, Screening Out Cyberbullying: Remedies for Victims on the 
Internet Playground, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1641, 1641–45 (2009). 
57  See id. 
58  Peter Steiner’s cartoon in the New Yorker, in which one dog sitting at a computer tells 
another dog that “on the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog,” has gained widespread fame as a 
symbol of Internet privacy and anonymity.  See Peter Steiner, Cartoon, The New Yorker, July 5, 
1993, at 61, available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/jomc/academics/dri/idog.html; Glenn 
Fleishman, Cartoon Captures the Spirit of the Internet, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2000, at G8 
(describing fame and profitability of Steiner’s cartoon). 
59  See Citron, supra note 7, at 69–81 (collecting sources); see also Kang, supra note 16, at 
1135 (“[R]ace and racism are already in cyberspace.”). 




threats and an image of Sierra next to a noose.60  As a result of the attacks, Sierra quit 
blogging and canceled a number of speaking engagements.61  Similarly, in 2007, the 
message board AutoAdmit was home to a series of threatening, harassing, and intrusive 
comments about female law students at numerous schools.62  These messages included an 
assertion hoping that one female Yale Law student would “get[] raped and die[]” and 
another claiming that she had a sexually transmitted disease.63  Attackers also attempted 
to ensure their behavior would reach beyond the single site by engaging in “Google-
bombing” so that the offensive threads would be prominent in Google searches for the 
female students’ names.64   
 Less malicious but also disheartening is what Neil Netanel characterizes as the 
“flame-ridden cacophony” of discourse on the Web.65  A great deal of user-generated 
content on the Web is inane and petty, and it often runs the risk of drowning out more 
valuable speech.66  In addition to genuine user-generated content, “spambots” spew out 
advertisements disguised as blog comments and message board postings.67  Tools 
including search engines, social bookmarking, and link-sharing features on social 
networks are designed to help Web users separate the wheat from the chaff.  Yet the 
quantity of low-value discourse creates real costs in effort for consumers looking for 
higher-quality content.  It also discourages participation by those who fear their 
                                                
60  See Citron, supra note 7, at 64–65. 
61  Id at 65. 
62  See Citron, supra note 7, at 71–75 (describing the attacks); Citizens Media Law Project, 
AutoAdmit, http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/autoadmit (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (history of 
the now-settled litigation). 
63  See Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008). 
64  See Citron, supra note 7, at 73–74. 
65  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal 
Democratic Theory, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 395, 432 (2000). 
66  This point has been made far too strongly at times.  See, e.g., Mark Helprin, Digital 
Barbarism: A Writer’s Manifesto passim (2009) (mocking the “mouth-breathing morons in 
backwards baseball caps” online); Andrew Keen, The Cult of the Amateur: How Today’s Internet 
is Killing Our Culture passim (2007) (suggesting the Web is full of “user-generated nonsense” 
that drowns out high-quality, professional work).  Nevertheless, even those who embrace the 
Internet’s freedom need only visit an unmoderated message board to concede the low quality of a 
significant amount of Internet discourse. 
67  See, e.g., Lessig Blog, Announcing the Hibernation of Lessig.org/blog, 
http://lessig.org/blog/2009/08/announcing_the_hibernation_of.html (Aug. 20, 2009, 2:15 EST) 
(announcing a sabbatical from blogging, in part because over one-third of the 30,000 comments 
posted to his site came from "fraudsters," including spambots advertising online casinos). 




contributions might be lost amid the cacophony.68  
  Another growing problem at the Web’s social layer is what Jonathan Zittrain 
terms “privacy 2.0.”69  “Privacy 2.0” issues originate in Web 2.0 user-generated content 
and emanate from individual to individual rather than from governments or large 
corporations, as with more traditional privacy problems.70  The story of “Star Wars Kid” 
is illustrative of privacy 2.0 concerns.  In 2002, a French Canadian high school student 
was videotaped pretending to swing a golf ball retriever like a lightsaber from Star 
Wars.71  Several of the student’s classmates found the video and put it online.72  By 
November of 2006, a marketing agency estimated that the video had been viewed 900 
million times.73  All of these viewings were without the consent of “Star Wars Kid” 
himself, who was upset with the experience and filed suit against his classmates who had 
first released the video.74  
  
 
B. Section 230 and the Failure of Site Operators to Manage Social Layer Problems 
 
 Social-layer problems could be mitigated by site operators, who control the 
content on their sites.  Yet this Sub-Part will show that they have lacked legal incentives 
and technical capacity to tackle these problems.  
 In the United States, the law permits site operators freedom in choosing whether 
to moderate user-generated content.75  In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 
a New York court held Prodigy, an early online service provider, liable for defamatory 
                                                
68  See, e.g., Patrick Leary et al., Free Speech, Quality Control, and Flame Wars, Academe, 
Jan.-Feb. 2007,  http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2007/JF/Feat/Lear.htm 
(describing, inter alia, efforts to put out flame wars on academic mailing lists in order to prevent 
quality contributors from leaving); Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, Developing a 
Comment Culture, http://volokh.com/posts/1233215010.shtml (Jan. 29, 2009, 2:43 EST) (“If a 
blogger doesn’t moderate comment threads at all on a widely read blog, people who want to be 
shocking, mean, or just irrelevant realize they can do their thing and reach a decent-sized 
audience.  They eventually push out the more thoughtful people . . . .”).  
69  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 205. 
70  See id.; see also Solove, supra note 21 (collecting stories throughout). 
71  See Helen A.S. Popkin, Survive Your Inevitable Online Humiliation, MSNBC.com, Sept. 
6, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20611439. 
72  See id. 
73  See Star Wars Kid is Top Viral Video, BBC News, Nov. 27, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm. 
74  See Popkin, supra note 71. 
75  While many of this Article’s points can apply with equal force in other countries, my 
focus is on the United States and U.S. law. 




statements posted by a third-party in its discussion forums.76  The court found that 
because Prodigy moderated its forums, it took sufficient responsibility for their contents 
to be deemed the publisher of the defamatory quotes.77  In 1996, Congress, unhappy with 
the Stratton Oakmont court’s decision to punish Prodigy for moderating its forums,78 
passed the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).79  One provision of the CDA, 
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 and commonly referred to as § 230, was designed to 
encourage “‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”80  Section 
230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”81  Courts quickly interpreted § 230 as a broad barrier to liability for 
hosts of third-party content.82  In addition, courts have construed “interactive computer 
service” broadly to include not only ISPs but also websites that host user-generated 
content.83   
                                                
76  Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
229, at *10–14 (N.Y.S.2d May 26, 1995). 
77  See id. 
78  See 141 Cong. Rec. H 8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); Ken S. 
Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 Harv. J. L. & 
Tech, 163, 173 (2006). 
79  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 
(1996).  The CDA is actually the short title for Title V of the larger Telecommunications Act of 
1996, which overhauled telecommunications law.  See id. § 501, 110 Stat. at 133. 
80  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
81  See id. § 230(c)(1). 
82  See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 669, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding based on § 230 that a website could not be 
held liable under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006), for third-party discriminatory 
housing advertisements); Universal Commc’n Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 
2007) (finding a search engine immunized against liability for third-party postings); Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000)  (finding AOL 
immunized against liability for third-party postings of allegedly inaccurate information on 
publicly traded stock); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding AOL 
immunized against liability for allegedly defamatory third-party posting).  But cf. Fair Hous. 
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
Roomates.com liable for third-party postings that violated the Fair Housing Act, based on the 
website’s discriminatory questions and choices of answers for users); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 
F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that § 230(c)(1) is “definitional” and thus not a 
barrier to liability where state law requires some standard of care for third parties).  
83  See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Lycos, 478 F.3d at 419; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006) (defining “interactive computer 
service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 




 Notwithstanding Congress’s goal, one result of § 230 is that site operators are free 
to ignore defamatory or otherwise tortious user-generated content on their sites.84  Daniel 
Solove argues that § 230 contributes to an atmosphere in which site operators gladly 
welcome non-tortious but offensive content on their sites, eager for the attention such 
content can bring.85  Therefore, Solove and others have called for § 230 to be reformed to 
open site operators to increased liability.86 
 Even those site operators who have wished to maintain minimum standards of 
quality for user participation have found it difficult to do so.  On popular sites that inspire 
uncommon devotion from visitors, site operators can give dedicated volunteers tools to 
moderate fellow participants.87  For site operators who cannot inspire volunteers, the 
alternatives are to hire moderators (for larger companies) or to moderate their own site 
(for hobbyists).  Since top-down methods of regulating user activity online are time- and 
labor-intensive, neither strategy can be wholly effective.  It would rarely make economic 
sense for professional operators of popular sites to hire enough employees to police all 
user-generated content.  Similarly, thorough moderation would often demand too much 
time from hobbyists to be reasonable. 
 Illustrative of the strategies employed by hobbyist site operators are those used by 
bloggers in a small corner of the “blogosphere” likely to be especially familiar to 
readers—law professors’ blogs.  On many such sites, the bloggers delete comments they 
deem inappropriate and delete commenter accounts of repeat offenders.88  Law professor 
                                                                                                                                            
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system 
that provides access to the Internet”).  Notably, at least one court has held that § 230 protects 
social networking sites.  See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848–50 (W.D. Tex. 
2007). 
84  See Solove, supra note 21, at 153–59; Citron, supra note 7, at 118–19. 
85  Solove, supra note 21, at 159; cf. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in 
Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 569, 629 
(2001) (contending that, if pushed by threats of liability, companies would invest in technological 
solutions to defamation).  
86  See Solove, supra note 21, at 159; Citron, supra note 7, at 115–25.  Others have called 
for increased liability for ISPs that fail to filter undesirable material.  See Doug Lichtman & Eric 
Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 221, 222–25 
(2006); Matthew G. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 is Outdated 
and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should be Reinstated Against Internet Service Providers, 
8 U. Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 3 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Digital Rights Management: 
Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 101, 115–18 (2007).  
Susan Freiwald has called for a more mixed approach.  See Freiwald, supra note 85, at 643 
(recommending comparative institutional analysis to determine when and where third-party 
liability is appropriate). 
87  See infra Parts IV.B & VII.B.3. 
88  See, e.g., Discourse.net, Comments Policy Version 1.2, 
http://www.discourse.net/archives/2008/09/comments_policy_version_12.html (Sept. 12, 2008, 
8:33 EST) (threatening deletion or “disemvowel[ment]” for policy violators); Kerr, supra note 68 




Michael Froomkin has threatened to block the IP addresses of especially vitriolic 
commenters from his site.89  An alternative to the ex post approach of deleting comments 
and commenters after the fact is an ex ante, or gatekeeping, approach.90 For example, on 
OrinKerr.com, Professor Kerr only allowed comments to be displayed that he approved 
or that came from a pre-approved source he trusted.91  Professors have expressed 
frustration at the amount of effort involved in moderating comments and at the obstinate 
nature of some malignant commenters.92  As a result, some simply disallow all 
comments.93  While by definition this final strategy always prevents unwanted user 
behavior, site operators must sacrifice all of the benefits of interactivity. 
                                                                                                                                            
(stating heavy moderation is necessary for productive discussion); Lessig Blog, 37 Helpful 
Comments Later, http://lessig.org/blog/2008/05/37_helpful_comments_later.html (May 1, 2008, 
21:58 EST) (stating author has started deleting personal attacks, having previously only deleted 
spam); Posting of Daniel Solove to Concurring Opinions, Our Comment Policy, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/our_comment_pol.html (Apr. 19, 2009, 
12:07 EST) (creating comment policy for group blog). 
89  See Froomkin, supra note 88.  An “IP address” is a unique numerical designation for 
computers, devices, and networks connecting to the Internet.  See Wikipedia, IP Address, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  Blocking an IP address bans 
any device at that address from using a site.  See Wikipedia, IP Blocking, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_blocking (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
90  See infra Part VII.B (discussing these terms more). 
91  See OrinKerr.com, A Comment About Comments, 
http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/05/04/a-comment-about-comments (May 4, 2006, 16:07 EST); 
OrinKerr.com, Welcome—And a Comment on Comments, 
http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/03/13/welcome-and-a-comment-on-comments (Mar. 13, 2006, 
00:15 EST).   
92  See, e.g., Posting of David Bernstein to Volokh Conspiracy, My Comments Policy, 
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1250794848.shtml (Aug. 20, 2009, 15:00 EST ) (stating the author 
will only leave comments open occasionally due to the effort involved in moderation); Posting of 
Orin Kerr to Volokh Conspiracy, Commenting About Commenting, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1229290087.shtml (Dec. 14, 2008, 16:28 EST) (expressing frustration at 
difficulty of moderation); Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports, A Word on My Comments Policy, 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2008/10/a-word-on-my-co.html (Oct. 20, 2008, 3:03 
EST) (stating that the authors opens comments only occasionally because doing it so is time-
consuming). 
93  See, e.g., Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, New Comments Policy at 
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/01/new-comments-policy-at-balkinization.html 
(Jan. 29, 2009, 00:17 EST) (stating the Balkinization group blog will not allow comments unless 
an author requests them); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, Some Additional Notes on 
Comments and Social Software, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/01/some-additional-notes-on-
comments-and.html (Jan. 29, 2009, 10:05 EST) [hereinafter Balkin Notes] (explaining why 
closing a comment section makes sense when moderation is difficult); Posting of Randy Barnett 
to Volokh Conspiracy, Comments Off, http://volokh.com/posts/1233607340.shtml (Feb. 2, 2009, 
3:42 EST) (stating the author is “out there without comments and lovin’ it”). 




 In sum, although site operators could, in theory, restrict abusive user behavior, 
under the status quo it is simply not realistic to expect them to do so.  Without legal 
incentives, site operators do not have to moderate, even in the face of tortious user 
behavior.  Moreover, without sufficient technical tools, most site operators have been left 
with a choice between shutting down user participation or opening participation to both 
good and bad alike.94 
 
 
C. Legal Scholars’ Responses to Problems at the Social Layer 
 
 Lawrence Lessig describes four methods of controlling behavior online:  law, 
code (or architecture), markets, and norms.95  Responses in the legal literature to the 
problems at the Web’s social layer can be divided into two groups:  (1) those that 
advocate legal solutions, and (2) those that advocate “soft” solutions based on norms.96  
This Sub-Part will sketch each of these two approaches. 
 Some scholars, politicians, and others call for a position that Danielle Citron 
memorably terms “fundamentally pro-regulatory.”97  These advocates believe that 
existing regulations are insufficient to protect against abusive online behavior.98  They 
are a part of a broader movement of writers who have pushed back against what they 
view as the “astringently libertarian” perspective that dominates Internet political 
culture.99  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to catalogue these writers’ 
proposals to regulate the Web’s social layer, they include calls to do the following:  
expand or alter the scope of private civil causes of action against either tortfeasors 
directly100 or against intermediaries,101 increase the substantive scope of applicable 
                                                
94  See Balkin Notes, supra note 93 (stating that “[c]ode matters” in moderation ability). 
95  See Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 120–25 (2006).   
96  Suggestions in both categories interact with code and markets, but solutions based solely 
on code or markets would be incongruous in the legal literature.   
97  Citron, supra note 7, at 66; see also infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
98  Citron provides a useful summary of existing tort and criminal law in the United States 
that could be used against abusive behavior online.  See Citron, supra note 7, at 86–88. 
99  Putnam, supra note 37, at 173; see also Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the 
Internet: Illusions of a Borderless World 136–45 (2006); Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace 85-90 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 111–12 (2007); Citron, supra 
note 7, at 66; Jay P. Kesan, Private Internet Governance, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 87, 90–93 (2003); 
Netanel, supra note 65; Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1974 
(2006).  
100  See, e.g., Solove, supra note 21, at 186–87 (proposing expansion of the appropriation 
tort); Abril, supra note 49 (advocating altering privacy torts for “spaceless” online world); Citron, 
supra note 7 (suggesting expanded application of civil rights law in online context). 




criminal law,102 decrease procedural protections for anonymous online parties,103 and 
mandate changes to code.104   
 In contrast, many scholars call for private responses to online social problems.105  
The Internet facilitates peer-production of goods and services.106  Norms are distributed 
and peer-produced principles of behavior.107  As a result, it should be no surprise that 
                                                                                                                                            
101  See supra note 82. 
102  See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the 
Internet, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 817, 869–71 (2001).  In 2006, teenager Megan Meier committed 
suicide after being provoked in a prank in which her neighbors pretended on MySpace to be a 
teenage boy who initially expressed romantic interest in Megan and then mocked her.  See Sarah 
Jameson, Cyberharrassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and Privacy, 17 
CommLaw Conspectus 231, 231–32 (2008).  Lori Drew, one of the neighbors who perpetrated 
the hoax, was prosecuted unsuccessfully in federal court.  See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 
449, 462–67 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing portion of indictment upon which Drew had been 
found guilty).  Due to moral outrage at the case and concern that no law forbade Lori Drew’s 
behavior, a number of anti-cyber-bullying laws have been proposed.  See 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts 
347 (amending Tennessee harassment law to forbid some forms of cyberbullying; passed into 
law, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-17-308 (2009)); Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 
1966, 111th Cong. (2009) (providing criminal fines or up to two years of imprisonment for “using 
electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile [harassing] behavior”); Jameson, supra, 
at 264-66 (advocating a federal criminal statute against cyberbullying). 
103  See, e.g., Jameson, supra note 102, at 265-66 (calling for decreased anonymity to battle 
cyberbullying); Jason Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public and 
Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J. 
Tech. L. & Pol’y 229, 254–59 (2008) (advocating a lower standard for revealing the identities of 
defendants under subpoena where the plaintiff is a private figure); infra note 310 and 
accompanying text.  Presently, most courts require some heightened proof from plaintiffs before 
they will allow subpoenas to be served on ISPs to unmask “John Doe” defendants.  See, e.g., Doe 
v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005); Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (D. Conn. 
2008). 
104  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and 
Technical Model, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1999) (arguing for a zoning system for the Internet); R. 
Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 755 (1999) (calling for site 
operators to be required to include easy-to-filter language in their sites’ codes). 
105  Because norms shape and delimit the possibilities for human behavior, they can be 
conceived as a form of “governance.”  See Lessig, supra note 99, at 122, 124; Netanel, supra note 
65, at 400.  
106  See generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production 
Transforms Markets and Freedom 29–127 (2006).  
107  See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 127–31 
(1991).   




some cyber-scholars hope “peer production of governance”108 and “netizenship” will 
flourish on Internet communities.109  While it is widely agreed that private ordering plays 
a significant role on the Web,110 these advocates hope to see it play a greater role.   
 Jonathan Zittrain expresses hope for “code-backed norms”—features embedded in 
websites or elsewhere on the Internet that enable users to develop and implement social 
governance.111  Analogously, Lior Strahilevitz, in How’s My Driving? For Everyone and 
Everything, proposes delegating traffic law enforcement to drivers by requiring placards 
on all automobiles to enable drivers to critique each other.112  He suggests that systems 
comparable to his How’s My Driving proposal could be deployed in other circumstances 
as well.113  Strahilevitz’s vision differs from Zittrain’s in that the How’s My Driving 
system would be government-mandated and backed by legal sanctions for oft-criticized 
drivers.114   
 Much of the remainder of this Article will focus on how social intermediaries 
promote the development of “code-backed norms” on the Web.  I will argue that “soft” 
governance will play an increasing role on the Web in coming years and that this change 
should generally be welcomed.  In doing so, I do not wish to rehash the old debate held at 
the dawn of the Internet’s public ascendancy over whether law should generally defer to 
norms with regard to online governance.115  Instead, I wish to make the more modest 
                                                
108  Johnson et al., supra note 2. 
109  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 127–149, 168–74, 223–31 (“The ongoing success of 
enterprises like Wikipedia suggests that social problems can be met first with social solutions—
aided by powerful technical tools—rather than by resorting to law.”); I. Trotter Hardy, The 
Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 993, 1040–41, 1054 (1994) 
(contending that the presumption for governance online should be in favor of self-help and 
custom rather than legal enforcement); David R. Johnson, The Life of the Law Online, 51 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 956, 966–71 (2006) (calling for the “rise of netizenship”); Johnson et al., supra note 
2 (suggesting that the Internet will become broken into smaller private communities of self-
governance); David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 Wayne L. Rev. 155, 170–71 (1996) 
(arguing the Internet may help realize radical liberty of choice in governance). 
110  Even skeptics of online norms concede this much.  See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and 
Economics of Internet Norms, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1257, 1260–61 (1998); Netanel, supra note 
65, at 451–52, 498. 
111  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 223–28. 
112  See Strahilevitz, supra note 15. 
113  See id. at 1759–65. 
114  See id. at 1717–19. 
115  The argument that private ordering online holds special normative value was often made 
in conjunction with the argument that jurisdictional issues render regulation of the Internet futile.  
See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1395–1400 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town 




claim that we should account for the coming growth of norms in our decisions about 
when and how to regulate, as the new growth of norms may sometimes obviate (or 
occasionally exacerbate) the need for regulation.   
 
 
IV. NORMS AND THE NON-INTERMEDIATED WEB  
 
  Consistent with this Article’s focus on “soft” governance, this Part will first 
briefly review general scholarship on norms.  It will then describe several websites that 
are widely cited as “code-backed norms” success stories.  Finally, it will examine why 
norms have not yet flourished on most sites. 
 
 
A. Norms Generally 
 
 Norms are privately created, implicit rules of behavior.116  Study of the 
relationship between law, norms, and economics has burgeoned in recent years.117  Legal 
scholars, drawing on social science literature and methodology, have investigated the role 
of norms in contexts ranging from ancient Athenian courts to modern American cotton 
producers.118  As Cass Sunstein explains, “norm management is an important strategy for 
accomplishing the objectives of law.”119  
 Jeffrey Rachlinski states that extensive social psychology research supports the 
following two propositions:  (1) “groups develop and impose norms on their members,” 
and (2) “the apparent behavior of others can alter the social meaning of a situation in 
ways that profoundly affect behavior.”120  In other words, norms influence our behavior 
                                                                                                                                            
Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 413, 477–78 (1997).  But 
see Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 99 (criticizing the view that jurisdictional challenges undermine 
the ability of sovereign states to regulate the Internet); Lemley, supra note 110 (contending that 
courts should not defer to online norms); Netanel, supra note 65 (arguing that legal regulation is 
superior to private ordering online based on liberal and democratic values). 
116  See Ellickson, supra note 107, at 127–31.  Robert Ellickson defines norms as means of 
informal control based upon social forces that are enforced through vicarious self-help sanctions.  
Id. at 131. 
117  See, e.g., infra notes 118–133. 
118  See Adriaan Lanni, Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens, 1 J. Legal Analysis 
691 (2009); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).  See 
generally  Lanni, supra, at 691–92 (cataloging empirical norms research by law professors); 
Lemley, supra note 110, at 1261–62 (acknowledging the existence of such research). 
119  See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 907 
(1996). 
120  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1537, 1540 




based both on external pressure from others and internalized desire to conform.121  Norms 
must be understood in their cultural context; Lawrence Lessig offers the example of a 
nineteenth century caning victim who, because of the social injury involved, feels more 
hurt than the loser of a pistol duel.122   
 Norms play an important role in group membership and group formation.123  
Norms are most likely to emerge successfully in close-knit groups, which are “made up 
of repeat players who can identify one another”124 and in which “power is broadly 
distributed among group members and the information pertinent to informal control 
circulates easily among them.”125  Homogeneity within groups promotes norm 
development as well, whether the homogeneity is based on shared traits or shared 
interests.126   
 Norms require significant community investment in enforcement.  If there are too 
many defectors and enforcement is lacking, it is hard to say that a norm exists.127  On the 
flip-side of enforcement, Dan Kahan explains that atmospheres of trust and reciprocity 
are key to norm creation.128  He also contends, based on social science research, that 
regulatory incentives can actually undermine cooperation by focusing people’s attention 
solely on self-interest.129 
 While norms are powerful, they are far more chaotic and less subject to 
                                                                                                                                            
(2000). 
121  See id. at 1545–46 (describing various theories on how norms influence behavior).  In 
contrast to this view, some law and economics scholars see norms only in terms of their relation 
to external motivation.  See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms 5, 11–27 (2002); Alex Geisinger, 
Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private 
Regulation, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2005). 
122  See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2181, 2183 
(1996). 
123  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 116, 134–35 (1992) (describing the diamond 
industry, in which group membership is valued over apparent contractual benefits). 
124  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 359, 359 (2003). 
125  Ellickson, supra note 107, at 177–78; accord Strahilevitz, supra note 124, at 359. 
126  See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 375 (2003). 
127  See Lessig, supra note 122, at 2185. 
128  See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003) (collecting social science research). 
129  See id. at 76–77; see also Jeffrey Rosen, I-Commerce: Tocqueville, the Internet, and the 
Legalized Self, 49 Drake L. Rev. 427, 427-28 (2001) (suggesting that an atmosphere of legalism 
can displace one of social norms). 




government control than legal regulation.130  First, norms can be hard to “aim.”  
Predicting how people react in specific circumstances can be difficult, and multiple 
norms can conflict with one another.131  Second, norms can compel socially harmful 
behavior.  For example, in a series of experiments, psychologist Stanley Milgram used 
social pressure to induce students to give apparently severe electric shocks to strangers.132  
Finally, the ability of individuals to recognize norms and group preferences is limited by 
human cognitive biases.133   
 
 
B. Norm Successes on the Web  
 
 Certain popular websites have successfully shaped user behavior through code-
backed norms.  This Sub-Part will briefly sketch the systems employed by the three sites 
that have been most widely praised in the legal literature as norm success stories:  
eBay,134 Wikipedia,135 and Slashdot.136   
 
 
1.   eBay 
 
 When buyers and sellers complete a transaction on eBay, the online auction site, 
they are encouraged to give feedback to the community on their partner in exchange.137  
Users can rate their experience as positive, neutral, or negative, and can leave text 
                                                
130  Nevertheless, law’s expressive value can help to some degree to foster specific norms.  
See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 1008-14, 1044 
(1995); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 404, 407–14 (discussing law’s use in establishing norms 
against online harassment of women). 
131  See Rachlinski, supra note 120, at 1566–67. 
132  See id. at 1556–62.  See generally Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (1974).  
133  See Geisinger, supra note 121, at 21–24. 
134  See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 50, at 471; Picker, supra note 8, at 6–7; Rosen, supra note 
129, at 435–36.   
135  See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 2, at 133–41; Myers, supra note 78, at 167–70. 
136  See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 106, at 76–80; Benkler, supra note 39, at 393–96; A. 
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 
Harv. L. Rev. 749, 863–67 (2003); Rosen, supra note 129, at 436. 
137  See eBay, How Feedback Works, http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/howitworks.html 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 




comments.138  These ratings contribute to users’ numerical “Feedback Score,” which 
eBay displays when those users sell or bid on items.139  Clicking on an individual’s user 
name or Feedback Score reveals text feedback that person has received.140  
 As discussed above, a good reputation assists sellers on eBay.141  Many books and 
compact discs are available that provide advice on how to develop a positive reputation 
on eBay.142  eBay is big business, with over $100 billion in sales of used goods in 
2008.143  These figures are striking since buyers must transact with total strangers who 
could easily swindle them;144 yet, thanks in significant part to its reputation system, eBay 
succeeds.145   
  
 
2.   Wikipedia 
 
 On Wikipedia, the “free encyclopedia,”146 anyone can edit most articles.147  Most 
                                                
138  See id.  Buyers can also leave more detailed numerical ratings for sellers, rating the 
sellers in response to four questions posed by eBay on a scale of one to five.  See eBay, About 
Detailed Seller Ratings, http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/detailed-seller-ratings.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
139  See How Feedback Works, supra note 137. 
140  See id. 
141  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
142  See Amazon.com, http://amazon.com (a search in all departments for “how to sell on 
eBay,” in quotation marks, reveals 66 books, DVDs, and similar products) (last visited Apr. 13, 
2009). 
143  See eBay, 2008 Annual Report 1 (2008), available at 
http://investor.ebay.com/annuals.cfm (click 2008 Annual Report - Interactive Annual Report).   
144  See Fahri Unsal & G. Scott Erickson, Online Auctions: A Review of Literature on Types 
of Fraud and Trust Building, in Trust and New Technologies: Marketing and Management on the 
Internet and Mobile Media 40, at 91, 94–97 (Teemu Kautonen & Heikki Karjaluoto eds., 2008). 
145  See id. at 102–04 (describing how eBay’s feedback system builds trust).  In addition to 
its reputation system, eBay facilitates trust by insuring some transactions and maintaining a multi-
step dispute resolution process.  See Johnson, supra note 109, at 970 (describing how the dispute 
resolution system contributes to transaction success and customer satisfaction); Unsal & 
Erickson, supra note 144, at 97 (explaining how eBay insures some transactions). 
146  Wikipedia, http://wikipedia.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  The focus of this Article is 
the governance of the English-language Wikipedia. 
147  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 133; Myers, supra note 78, at 167 & n.30. 




changes are viewable instantaneously.148  Individuals need not register to edit articles, 
though unregistered users’ IP addresses are displayed in conjunction with their edits.149  
Despite the apparent potential for abuse, Wikipedia is a staggering success.  There are 
over 3,200,000 articles in English, articles in 272 languages, and an estimated average 79 
million unique monthly visitors from the United States as of April 2010.150  A widely-
publicized study found the accuracy of English language articles in Wikipedia equal to 
those in Encyclopedia Britannica.151 
 How is quality ensured when anyone can edit Wikipedia?  The transparency of 
Wikipedia makes it easy to correct mistakes.152  Each encyclopedia entry has a history 
page that displays a list of every change made and the user name (or IP address) of the 
author who made the change.153  Entries can be reverted to any prior version easily.154  
Each entry also has an attached discussion page where editors can share ideas and debate 
what should be said.155  Like articles, registered users each have pages that list all of the 
edits they have made and discussion pages where other editors can offer praise or 
criticism.156  Additionally, automated programs clean up the work of the most obvious 
vandals.157  To prevent libel, alterations to articles about living people by unregistered or 
inexperienced editors must be “flagged,” or approved, by experienced editors before they 
                                                
148  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 133; Wikipedia, Protection Policy, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Protection_policy (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (describing 
limitations on who can edit certain articles). 
149  See Wikipedia, Why Create an Account?, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Why_create_an_account (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  
Additionally, only registered users whose accounts have existed for at least four days and who 
have made at least ten contributions can edit “semi-protected” pages.  See id. 
150  See Quantcast, Wikipedia.org, http://www.quantcast.com/wikipedia.org (last visited Apr. 
4, 2010) (stating estimate of visitors); Wikimedia Meta, List of Wikipedias, 
http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wikipedias (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (stating number of 
languages); Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (stating number of 
articles in English). 
151  See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopedias Go Head to Head, 438 Nature 900 (2005). 
152  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 137. 
153  See id. at 133–34; Myers, supra note 78, at 167–68.  The IP addresses of unregistered 
editors are displayed in place of user names.  See Why Create an Account?, supra note 149. 
154  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 133–34. 
155  See id. at 134. 
156  See id. at 136.  Zittrain describes the practice of Wikipedians awarding each other 
“barnstars,” digital images of stars that represent thanks for high-quality editing.  See id. 
157  See id. at 137–138; Myers, supra note 78, at 168. 




are publicly displayed.158  Wikipedian leaders, called administrators, can ban the accounts 
or even IP addresses of especially abusive editors.159 
 Wikipedia’s governance is not purely bottom-up.  As already discussed, 
experienced editors have certain powers beyond those of new editors, and administrators 
have authority beyond other experienced editors.160  To be promoted to administrator 
status, editors must apply to existing administrators and receive roughly 75% approval.161  
Wikipedia also has a handful of “bureaucrats” who are appointed by Wikipedia founder 
Jimbo Wales and possess authority above all other users.162   
 Despite some elements of an aristocracy at the tip of the iceberg, Wikipedians 
have developed a robust bottom-up culture.163  Its editors have produced extensive 
guidelines for each other.164  However, they also encourage experimentation; one of the 
guidelines is “be bold” in editing.165  Though conflict arises thanks to this permissive 
attitude, Wikipedia has extensive dispute resolution systems.166  The result of 
Wikipedia’s openness is a strong community of regular editors, and Jonathan Zittrain 
highlights the site as a model of netizenship.167 
 
 
                                                
158  See Noam Cohen, Wikipedia to Limit Changes to Articles on People, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
24, 2009, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/technology/internet/25wikipedia.html. 
159  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 136.   
160  See Myers, supra note 78, at 169 (describing administrators’ authority). 
161  See id.; Wikipedia, Guide to Requests for Adminship, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Guide_to_requests_for_adminship (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010).  
162  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 135–36, 138–41; Myers, supra note 78, at 169; Wikipedia, 
Bureaucrats, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Bureaucrats (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).   
163  Wikipedia’s page describing administrators’ roles begins with an emphatic statement 
that being one is “[n]o big deal.”  Wikipedia, Administrators, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
164  See Myers, supra note 78, at 169–70. 
165  Wikipedia, Be Bold, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Be_bold (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010). 
166  See generally Wikipedia, Dispute Resolution, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
167  Zittrain, supra note 2, at 146–48. 




3.   Slashdot 
 
 Slashdot bills itself as conveying “news for nerds” about “stuff that matters,” and 
its posts cover technology, science, software, gaming, and cyberlaw.168  Slashdot 
maintains an innovative distributed moderation system for its comment section.  
Moderators are selected semi-randomly at preset intervals from regular commenters.169  
Moderators can rate users’ comments on a series of pre-set characteristics, such as 
“insightful,” “funny,” or “troll,” on a scale ranging from +5 (best) to -1 (worst).170  
Ratings are visible to readers alongside comments.171  Comments with sufficiently 
positive ratings move up on the list of comments so visitors see them sooner, while 
comments with low ratings are invisible to readers who are not logged in.172  Logged-in 
users can adjust their “thresholds” for low-rated comments so that more or fewer 
comments are displayed to them.173  Over time, based on ratings received and other on-
site actions, commenters develop “karma,” a verbal grade on a scale ranging from 
“[t]errible” to “[e]xcellent.”174  Karma can affect the placement of all of an individual’s 
comments as well as that person’s ability to become a moderator.175  To prevent abuses, a 
“meta-moderation” system also exists for rating moderators.176 
 
 
4.   Commonalities 
 
 There are several commonalities among these widely-praised sites.  First, despite 
their large number of visitors, the sites provide easy methods for users to view each 
others’ reputational information.  Second, reputation development is reciprocal; those 
who wish to comment on others’ behavior must also open themselves to being rated.  
                                                
168  Slashdot, http://slashdot.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  For an excellent summary of 
Slashdot’s features, see Froomkin, supra note 136, at 863–67. 
169  See Slashdot, FAQ—Comments and Moderation, http://slashdot.org/faq/com-mod.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
170  See id. 
171  See id. 
172  See id. 
173  See id. 
174 See Slashdot, FAQ—Comments and Moderation, http://slashdot.org/faq/com-mod.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
175  See id. 
176  See Slashdot, FAQ – Meta-Moderation, http://slashdot.org/faq/metamod.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010). 




Third, the sites do not merely expect norms to emerge in a vacuum, but instead contain 
code designed to help foster social governance.  Finally, they give users incentives to opt 
into the norm system and to take it seriously177  As a result, they attract a high number of 
dedicated participants.   
 
 
B. Failure of Norms: The Web as “Classic Counterexample”  
 
 While a handful of sites, like those described above, have had success with norm-
driven user governance, most sites have failed to inculcate any sense of “netizenship” in 
visitors.  This Sub-Part explores the reasons for that failure, which relate to the Web’s 
structure.   
 First, the Web is too big and heterogeneous to be a unified community.178  
Second, the value of social capital on the Web is low since it cannot be transferred 
effectively between sites.179  The low value of social capital hurts “netizenship” because 
the cost of norm creation is high.180  Web users have insufficient incentives to invest 
themselves in individual Web communities, so the communities lack the critical mass of 
participation needed for norm generation.   
 Third, freedom of movement online undercuts our ability to police one another.  
In contrast to the offline world, people on the Web are not channeled into natural 
communities by geography.181  While the Internet offers radically more freedom of 
choice in peer groups than is available offline, the decreased cost of site entry and exit 
renders social sanctions ineffective.182  A participant in an online community need not 
suffer the indignity of the sanction since he or she may leave easily and join a similar 
community on a different site where the sanction cannot follow.183  If a site does not 
engage in IP-address based blocking techniques, the sanctioned party can also return to 
                                                
177  For instance, on Wikipedia, users can edit without registering, but their changes are less 
likely to stay in the long-term.  See Posting of Ed H. Chi to Augmented Social Cognition, Part 2: 
More Details of Changing Editor Resistance in Wikipedia, http://asc-
parc.blogspot.com/2009/08/part-2-more-details-of-changing-editor.html (Aug. 7, 2009, 19:09 
EST). 
178  See Lemley, supra note 110, at 1267–73.  Lemley wrote almost a decade ago, and the 
Web has grown substantially since that time. See supra note 25. 
179  See supra Part II.B. 
180  See Netanel, supra note 65, at 432. 
181  See Johnson & Post, supra note 115, at 1370–76 (explaining how cyberspace 
undermines geographic boundaries). 
182  See infra Part VII.C.1–3. 
183  See id. 




the same community under a different user name, unhindered by the sanction.184  The 
combination of insufficient incentives for quality contributions and insufficient 
deterrence for low-quality contributions engenders the “flame-ridden cacophony” 
criticized by Neil Netanel.   
 Moreover, feelings of disinterest in the welfare of fellow users are exacerbated by 
the dehumanizing nature of Web communication.  Robert Putnam, in his classic work on 
community association and politics, Bowling Alone, writes that trust and collaboration are 
in short supply on the Internet because “interaction is anonymous and not nested in a 
wider social context.”185  On the Web, we may see each other not as real people, but as 
just a few lines of text.186  Although the introduction of broadband has offered more 
opportunities for multimedia presentations of self,187 these still cannot convey the same 
sense of “personhood” as a brief in-person interaction.  Additionally, without social 
intermediaries, I may see you only as a commenter on a political blog; I do not also see 
that you have a family, or are interested in jazz, or are a military veteran.  It is thus easy 
for me to invest you with far less than full personhood.  If I do not agree with you 
politically, I may be inclined to dismiss you as mistaken and worthless.  Dehumanization 
increases abusive behavior, undermining social cohesion.  As Danielle Citron explains, 
social psychology research indicates that it is much easier for people to victimize others 
who they do not invest with full humanity.188  Individuals mediated by computers are 
more likely to victimize each other than those meeting face-to-face, even when using the 
Internet makes attackers no less likely to be caught.189   
 Given these and other factors, Neil Netanel described virtual communities on the 
Web as a “classic counterexample[]” to the type of situation in which norms would 
succeed in constraining individual behavior.190  Although Netanel wrote almost a decade 
ago, his assertion has remained largely correct. Nevertheless, as the next Part describes, 
change is coming. 
 
 
                                                
184  See Citron, supra note 7, at 104. 
185  Putnam, supra note 37, at 176. 
186  See Citron, supra note 7, at 84 (“Online groups also perceive their victims as ‘images’ 
and thus feel free to do anything they want to them.”). 
187  See Kang, supra note 16, at 1156, 58. 
188  See Citron, supra note 7, at 82–84 (collecting sources). 
189  See Auerbach, supra note 56, at 1643–44 (“[T]he anonymity with which children can 
often post messages or create websites empowers them to be more hurtful because they can 
launch their invective with little fear of reprisal . . . .”); Citron, supra note 7, at 83–84 n.171 and 
accompanying text; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and 
Anonymous Speech, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1537, 1575 & n.178 (2007).  
190  Netanel, supra note 65, at 429.  




V. INTRODUCING SOCIAL INTERMEDIARIES  
 
 This Part introduces social intermediaries, which I contend will act as “social 
glue”191 to bind together users on the Web.  I first describe and explain social 
intermediaries.  Next, I summarize features that many leading social intermediaries have 




A. Social Intermediaries: Glue for the Social Web   
 
 Social intermediary service Pluck, in a perceptive White Paper, highlights the 
striking division between websites on which identity would be useful and those on which 
it is contained.192  The latter type of site, which Pluck labels “social destinations,”193 are 
more commonly called social networks.  A typical social network allows users to write a 
personal profile, communicate with those other users, and share photographs and other 
media.194  Popular social networks in the United States include Facebook, MySpace, and 
LinkedIn.195  Social networks are repositories for online identity and reputation.196  As 
Patricia Abril observes, “[f]or [social networking site] participants, a web page or online 
profile constitutes their identity in cyberspace.”197  Yet until recently, social networks 
have been gated communities of within-site activity. 
 Social intermediaries are the cross-Web successors to social networks.  This Sub-
Part first describes the software backbone for social intermediaries.  It then describes the 
sites that will form the face of the Social Web.  The purpose of this discussion is not to 
contend that the particular tools described below will become prominent.  My goal is 
instead to introduce examples of the kinds of features one should expect to encounter on 
the Social Web.   
 
 
                                                
191  For use of the term “social glue,” see, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 99, at 97. 
192  See Pluck, supra note 5, at 1–3. 
193  See id. 
194  Abril, supra note 49, at 13. 
195  See id.  Different social networking sites are popular in different parts of the world.  See 
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visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
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Mapping the Challenges and Promises of User-Generated Information Flows, 18 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 741, 747 (2008). 
197  Abril, supra note 49, at 13. 




1.   The Backbone: OpenID and Related Software 
 
 Because individuals must typically create a new user name and password 
combination for each site they use, it is easy for people to become overloaded and forget 
their passwords or forget which name goes with which site.198  OpenID, a shared 
authentication system, aims to change this situation.  OpenID allows users to “sign in to 
thousands of websites without ever needing to create another username and password.”199  
Through OpenID, one account can unlock many sites.   
 Sites that are willing to allow users to sign in via OpenID are called “relying 
parties” by the OpenID Foundation.200  As of November 2009, over 50,000 sites were 
relying parties, with the number steadily increasing since OpenID’s founding in 2005.201  
Relying parties include Web giants like AOL, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!.202  As a 
result of its growth, tech entrepreneur site VentureBeat recently stated that OpenID “is 
beginning to show signs of going more mainstream on the [W]eb.”203 
 It is easy for users to obtain an OpenID-enabled account.  In fact, many people 
already have “OpenIDs” without realizing it.  This is true because there is no single 
OpenID account format.  Instead, OpenID is designed to facilitate sign-in using accounts 
from third-party sites that have chosen to be OpenID “providers.”204  Google, AOL, 
Yahoo!, MySpace, and Twitter are all OpenID providers.205  To illustrate, users could 
visit MyKMart.com, an OpenID relying party, and then choose to sign in using their 
Google accounts.206  Thus, users do not have to know that OpenID exists to enjoy its 
                                                
198  See Aresty, supra note 12, at 148–49.   
199  See OpenID, Benefits of OpenID, http://openid.net/get-an-openid/individuals (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
200  See, e.g., OpenID Wiki, Relying Party Best Practices, http://wiki.openid.net/Relying-
Party-Best-Practices (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).   
201  See OpenID, What is OpenID?, http://openid.net/get-an-openid/what-is-openid (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010); Posting of Michael Olson to JanrRain Blog, Relying Party Stats as of July 
1, 2009, http://blog.janrain.com/2009/07/relying-party-stats-as-of-july-1-2009.html (July 15, 
2009, 16:40 EST); see also MyOpenID, OpenID Site Directory, 
https://www.myopenid.com/directory (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing directory of OpenID 
relying parties). 
202  See OpenID Foundation Website, http://openid.net (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
203  Posting of Eric Eldon to VentureBeat, Single Sign-On Service OpenID Getting More 
Usage, http://digital.venturebeat.com/2009/04/14/single-sign-on-service-openid-getting-more-
usage (Apr. 14, 2009). 
204  See OpenID, Get an OpenID, http://openid.net/get-an-openid (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
205  See id.   
206  See MyKmart, http://mykmart.com (click “log in”) (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 




benefits.207    
 OpenID is open-source software.208  Being open-source means that anyone can 
see OpenID’s source code (human-readable programming code), anyone can edit 
OpenID’s software, and anyone can install OpenID for free.209  Brad Fitzpatrick, 
described as the father of OpenID, stated:  “Nobody should own this. Nobody’s planning 
on making any money from this. . . . It benefits the community as a whole if something 
like this exists, and we’re all a part of the community.”210  
 Security is the largest concern with regard to OpenID.  OpenID contends that it is 
more secure than traditional password systems.211  Specifically, OpenID asserts that 
because each individual’s password is stored on only one provider’s site, the chance of 
theft is decreased compared to using many passwords stored on multiple sites.212  
However, OpenID creates the risk of phishing, or theft of personal information through 
deception.213  Specifically, malicious relying parties could use programming tricks to 
swipe users’ passwords and then use those passwords to access the users’ data on other 
OpenID-enabled sites.214  The OpenID community recognizes that phishing is a risk and 
is working to develop technological and education-based solutions.215 
 OpenID is part of what Joseph Smarr labels the “Open Stack.”216  The Open 
Stack, according to Smarr, is a set of open-source technical standards designed to 
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facilitate the spread of social networking features.217  Like OpenID, the remaining Open 
Stack features are designed to be invisible to typical users.  Also like OpenID, other 
components of the Open Stack have grown in popularity quickly.218   
 One component of the Open Stack is OpenSocial, a package of application 
programming interfaces (“APIs”) that allow programmers to design applets for social 
networks that support its standards.219  In other words, OpenSocial provides a method for 
third-parties to add activities such as games, surveys, and personal organizers to social 
networking sites.  Sites including LinkedIn, Friendster, and Google accept applets 
programmed on OpenSocial.220  Facebook has a competing API for its network, called 
the “Graph API.”221 
 Also included in the Open Stack is OAuth, the Web’s “valet key.”222  Through 
OAuth, which complements OpenID’s functions, users can allow one website limited 
access to their private data stored remotely on a different website.223  OAuth powers 
Facebook Open Graph’s cross-Web account authentication system.224  PortableContacts, 
the fourth component of the Open Stack, is a newer project being spearheaded by Smarr 
and others to enable individuals to build a single, portable Web address book.225 
 OpenID and the Open Stack, or their competitors, will be the backbone of the 
emerging Social Web.  Most notably as it relates to norms and reputation, OpenID and 
OAuth provide powerful tools for employing the same accounts across many websites.  
The next sub-Part will explore the user-facing social intermediary sites, which build upon 
the software foundations discussed above. 
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2. The Face of the Social Web 
 
 The tools described in this Sub-Part represent examples of the intermediaries 
through which users seeking cross-Web functionality will interact.  These tools channel 
the programming frameworks described above into specific features for site operators and 
users.  I refer to these tools as social intermediaries since they are the cross-Web 
evolution of social networks.226 
 Presently, the two most ambitious social intermediary projects are Google Friend 
Connect and Facebook’s Open Graph.  Perhaps not coincidentally, both Google Friend 
Connect and Open Graph’s predecessor, Facebook Connect, were first made public in 
preliminary “beta” form on December 4, 2008.227  As of December 2009, over 60,000 
websites had already adopted Facebook Connect (similar statistics are not readily 
available for Google Friend Connect).228 
 Google Friend Connect promises site operators that it can help them build 
communities without requiring complex programming.229  First, site operators can choose 
from a catalog of applets programmed on the OpenSocial API.230  For instance, Friend 
Connect offers applets that allow visitors to leave comments, rate and review site content, 
become site “members,” and advertise content to others.231  Building on the Open Stack 
framework, Friend Connect also gives users options for choosing their account providers.  
Users can interconnect their on-site actions to their existing Google accounts, including 
their Google profiles and Gmail addresses.232  Alternatively, users can represent 
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themselves with accounts from OpenID providers other than Google and can incorporate 
personal information stored on third-party providers’ sites into Friend Connect-enabled 
sites.233   
 Facebook’s Open Graph advertises a similar array of features,234 but with special 
emphasis on integrating with the existing Facebook social network.  For instance, when 
users visit a Facebook-enabled site, they can see what content on that site has been 
popular with their Facebook “friends” and choose to share content they enjoy with 
others.235  One key feature of Open Graph is that sites can add a “like” or “recommend” 
button; when users click the button, it adds a link to the site on their Facebook profiles, 
shares the link with their Facebook friends, and displays their names and photographs to 
Facebook friends who visit.236  When users participate on a site via Open Graph, 
Facebook promises the site operator access to data including the user’s name, 
photograph, and Facebook friends.237  It also promises operators the ability to integrate 
their content with Facebook, such as by adding items to users’ “story streams” and by 
communicating to users’ friends via Facebook notifications.238   
 Open Graph is distinct in light of Facebook’s unique emphasis on “real life,” 
offline identity.  Facebook’s terms of service state that “Facebook users provide their real 
names and information,” and they prohibit users from providing any false personal 
information.239   Facebook’s terms also permit only one account per individual.240  
Facebook also has engaged in an active campaign of deleting clearly fake profiles, 
resulting in the mistaken deletion of legitimate accounts.241  Leading competitors 
typically do not prevent users from adopting pseudonyms or creating multiple 
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 Facebook and Google Friend Connect seek to offer features applicable to all 
websites.  More narrowly, a number of companies, including Disqus, JS-Kit, 
IntenseDebate, Pluck, and KickApps, all offer tools focusing on commenting systems for 
blogs and other similar sites.243  All five of the companies mentioned above allow users 
to leave comments on multiple supporting blogs with the same account.244  They also 
permit users to create central profiles in which they can input personal information.245  
On all five, profiles also act as easily accessible records of all commenting activities for 
each user.246  Additionally, these social intermediaries have “friending” features; for 
instance, on Disqus, individuals can choose to “subscribe” to commenters they like so 
that they can see all of their future comments.247  They also offer powerful tools for site 
moderation.248  All five support login via many OpenID providers as well as via 
Facebook.249  In addition, JS-Kit allows users to sign into its system using multiple 
accounts simultaneously, so that they can share their activities through multiple social 
networks simultaneously.250  
 The reputation and rating systems of Disqus and IntenseDebate are especially 
notable.  Disqus and IntenseDebate allow users to choose whether to rate comments 
positively or negatively.251  Users must be logged in to their own accounts to rate others’ 
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comments.252  As participants comment more and receive more ratings, they obtain “clout 
points” (on Disqus) or “reputation points” (on IntenseDebate), which are calculated 
according to undisclosed algorithms.253  These ratings are then displayed along with 
users’ comments.254  To protect the quality of its rating system, Disqus allows only 
experienced users to rate others, and it forbids self-serving and collusive ratings.255  
Disqus also intends to allow site operators to moderate based on clout points.256 
 Site operators are not presently limited to using only one of the above-described 
systems.  Social intermediary services including Facebook and Google allow sites to 
implement features from multiple providers.257  It is not uncommon for sites to give users 
a choice of identity providers and to offer social features from a number of services.258 
 While the systems described above are focused on exporting social features to 
outside sites, companies such as Google are bringing blog consumers to enclosed 
ecosystems containing social features.  Through Google Reader, people can subscribe to 
all of the blogs and other syndicated websites they enjoy and read them together in one 
place.259  Recently, Google has been introducing social features to Google Reader.  Users 
can choose to “share” blog posts they enjoy with others who also use Google Reader and 
to “follow” those whose shared posts they wish to read.260  Users can also offer 
comments on articles within Google Reader without posting on the actual blog’s 
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comment section.261  Individuals can also mark that they “like” an article; the names of 
all the users who “liked” an article then appear at the top of that article for everyone who 
views it through Google Reader.262  
 
 
B. Summary of Features of Social Intermediaries 
 
 While the social intermediaries described above vary, and new competitors may 
emerge, certain features are common to multiple providers.  For convenience, this Sub-
Part will summarize some of the common features to which the remainder of this Article 
will refer regularly.   
 Site operators who install social intermediaries will gain the ability to add social 
features to their site.  They will also gain the ability to moderate user activity with greater 
ease and greater strength.  On most social intermediaries, each user will have: 
 
• The ability to add content to third-party websites under a consistent account  
• A “friending” or “following” ability, by which users can gain easier or greater 
access to the profiles of, and other information concerning, a select subset of 
fellow users 
• Privacy controls analogous to those on social networks, by which users can 
choose to restrict the public availability of the information described above   
• A profile page that is easily accessible from third-party sites on which the user has 
participated via the social intermediary.  The profile page may contain the 
following features: 
▪ Areas for the user to describe himself or herself 
▪ Space for images or other multimedia content, including pictures of the 
user 
▪ Automatically compiled information linking to all of the user’s cross-Web 
activity employing the social intermediary 
▪ A section in which other users can comment publicly to the user 
▪ A list of all of the “friends” or “followers” of the user, along with links to 
their profiles 
 
 While only available at this time on a minority of social intermediaries, the 
“reputation score” systems used by Disqus and IntenseDebate also are of particular 
importance for the remainder of this Article.  
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C. Likelihood of Popularity   
 
 It is easy to make mistaken predictions about the importance of a hypothesized 
technological and social trend that fails to materialize.263  Before analyzing the impact of 
the Social Web on norms and law, it is important to determine whether there will be a 
Social Web.  Accordingly, this Sub-Part will suggest why social intermediaries are likely 
to grow in popularity with both site operators and end users. 
 
 
1. Advantages for Site Operators 
 
   Site operators have much to gain from social intermediaries.  Most importantly, 
social intermediaries allow them to incorporate user-generated content easily without 
requiring a high degree of programming skill.  Social intermediaries are highly 
customizable; unlike the rigid and basic comment systems of the past, site operators are 
able to incorporate multimedia third-party content easily and flexibly.  Moreover, social 
intermediaries make it far easier to regulate and moderate user behavior, enabling site 
operators to provide better user experiences and consistently high-quality content.264 
 Social intermediaries offer other benefits to site operators as well.  Shared 
authentication makes it easier for users to begin participating on sites quickly.265  Instead 
of spending time creating a new account information, visitors can begin engaging with a 
site’s features immediately.  Social intermediaries also provide capacity for “distributed 
advertising” to site operators.266  Distributed advertising relies on users to spread 
information about sites or products they like to their acquaintances.267  Distributed 
advertising may be more valuable than conventional advertising because it is free, 
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acquaintances naturally share affinities, and people typically put more weight on their 
friends’ recommendations over those of paid endorsers.268  Facebook advertises that it 
gives sites access to the data in the personal profiles of users who have not opted out of 
“instant personalization.”269  Finally, since social intermediaries track users’ cross-Web 
activities, they can give site operators access to useful marketing data about users.270  Of 
course, as beneficial as distributed advertising, access to user data, and tracking features 
may be for site operators and advertisers, they raise serious privacy concerns for users.271  
 Not all site operators will want to install social intermediaries.  Some might be 
content with static sites and uninterested in user-generated content.  Operators of 
especially popular Web 2.0 sites, such as eBay, might already have well-developed 
communities and interface features and thus will see little to gain from social 




2.   Advantages for Users 
 
 Many of the reasons social intermediaries will be attractive to consumers overlap 
with the reasons for their value to site operators.  First, shared authentication makes it 
easier for first-time visitors to access a new site’s features.  Second, distributed 
advertising can make it easier for consumers to find sites they will enjoy.  Third, social 
intermediaries introduce new opportunities for building online social circles; users can 
make new acquaintances on one site they visit and then can interact with them across the 
Web.  Most importantly, users can begin to compile reputational data from their activities 
across the Web.273 
 The leading drawback of social intermediaries for users is loss of privacy.274    
There is some evidence of a privacy-based backlash against Facebook’s especially 
aggressive implementation of its social intermediary software.275  Nevertheless, in 
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general, privacy-ceding electronic media applications such as existing social networks 
and location-based games have only grown in popularity,276 particularly among young 
people.277  This implies that many users are willing to trade privacy for connectivity.  In 
Saving Facebook, however, James Grimmelmann suggests that cognitive biases prevent 
people from sufficiently appreciating the privacy risks of social networking sites.278  If he 
is correct, similar errors in judgment may be at play in users’ decisions to participate on 
sites that employ social intermediaries.  Facebook’s opt-out approach and ever-changing 
privacy policy may especially obfuscate privacy risks for users.279  Nevertheless, 
regardless of whether the trend towards interconnection is based on conscious choice or 
instead based on lack of understanding, it is reasonable to expect this trend to continue, 
so that social intermediaries’ popularity will grow notwithstanding privacy concerns.  
 
 
E. Network Effects 
 
 There is an additional reason to believe social intermediaries might become 
widely used.  Based on “network effects,” if one or a few social intermediaries become 
popular, their value will increase, leading to a potential upward cycle of adoption.  In 
economic theory, the value of most goods does not vary with the number of people who 
possess and use them.  My banana does not taste better if many other people are eating 
bananas simultaneously.  In contrast, “network effects” apply to goods whose value 
increases as more people possess and use them.280  Telephones are “network goods”; a 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/before_you_go_blocking_facebooks_instant_personali.p
hp (Apr. 23, 2010, 7:25 EST) (noting informal evidence of backlash soon after Open Graph’s 
debut); Posting of Robert Quigley to Geekosystem, Did the Great Facebook Deactivation Wave 
of 2010 Just Kick Off?, http://www.geekosystem.com/facebook-deactivate-wave (May 6, 2010, 
14:15 EST) (describing announcement by two prominent technology writers that they eliminated 
their Facebook accounts, and noting that Google searches for the phrase “deactivate Facebook” 
have tripled since Open Graph’s debut).  
276  See, e.g., Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010) (stating Facebook has over 300 million active users); Wikipedia, Location-
Based Game, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Location-based_game (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) 
(listing electronic games in which success is based on position, as tracked by GPS). 
277  See John Palfrey & Urs Gasser, Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of 
Digital Natives 22–37 (2008). 
278  See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 1160–64. 
279  See Posting of Pete Cashmore to Mashable, Nobody Can Stop Facebook Because 
Nobody Understands Facebook, Mashable, http://mashable.com/2010/05/04/facebook-privacy-
report (Apr. 27, 2010); see also Posting of Kurt Opsahl to Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-
timeline (Apr. 28, 2010) (documenting changes to Facebook’s privacy policy over time). 
280  See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 479 (1998).   




telephone is useful only as a paperweight if nobody else has one.281 Telephones are 
examples of “true” network goods, in that their “value lies in facilitating interactions 
between a consumer and others who own the product.”282 
 Like telephones, social intermediaries are true network goods.283  If a social 
intermediary gains a foothold among site operators and users, its value will increase, 
potentially leading to greater adoption.  An upward spiral can result.  Networked goods 
tend towards convergence on a single standard.284  Social intermediary providers’ 
awareness of this fact helps explain their rush to develop, deploy, and market these 
tools.285  The possibility of capturing a significant portion of the market helps explain 
why Google and Facebook, which already have large bases of participants, have been at 
the forefront of developing social intermediaries.  While convergence may occur in the 
future, at present competition is hot, and new competitors may emerge beyond those 
described above.   
 
 
VI. IDENTITY, REPUTATION AND THE SOCIAL WEB 
 
 This Part will first show that social intermediaries enable individuals to project a 
consistent identity across much of the Web.  It will then explain how social 
intermediaries open the reputation economy to everyone.  It will then consider legal rules 
needed to protect the information value of portable reputational data.  Finally, it will 
examine how social intermediaries humanize interactions on the Web, promoting a 
culture of respect for other people and other ideas.  
 
 
A. Portable Identity Enabled 
 
 Social intermediaries bind together our previously disaggregated identities on the 
Web.  I no longer must let others guess whether I am the same person from site to site 
based on ad hoc clues I might leave.  As long as I sign in using the same account from 
the same OpenID provider (or competing account system), I show that my actions across 
multiple websites originate from the same source.  Conversely, others cannot claim my 
social intermediary-facilitated activity as their own. Social intermediaries therefore 
remove much of the veil from agency on the Web.286   
                                                
281  See id. at 488. 
282  Id. at 491.   
283  Id. at 491.   
284  See id. at 496–97. 
285  See generally id. at 495 (noting that first-movers gain substantial advantages in 
competitions to market networked goods). 
286  Of course, even with social intermediaries, it is too much to say that consumers will 




 Of course, not all sites will accept accounts from the same providers.  
Accordingly, social intermediaries do not make it possible to maintain a single universal 
Web identity.  Nevertheless, given the network effects-based advantages, it is reasonable 
to project that many sites will choose to accept accounts from popular providers.  
Therefore, it is likely that significant cross-site identity transfer will be possible.   
 In sum, social intermediaries go a great distance toward remedying the absence of 
identity information in the Internet’s design.  Rather than being located in the 
infrastructure layers, the ability to project a consistent identity across the Web is instead 
made available at the application layer. 
 
 
B. Reputation Economy for Everyone 
 
 By making it easier for users to compile far richer reputational data, social 
intermediaries allow everyone to participate in the reputation economy.  Rather than 
having their reputational information stranded on dozens of sites, users can build a single 
multi-site profile.  Profiles can thus reflect an individual’s diverse interests.  Each user’s 
profile can compile all of his or her cross-Web activity under that account.  These 
compendiums of cross-Web activity scale easily; even if users participate thousands of 
times on hundreds of sites, the automated links generated can still be displayed and 
understood easily.  Profiles can also provide information about online relationships built 
across many different sites.  In each user’s profile, his or her cross-Web “friends” can 
provide public messages, share links, and offer other information.   
 Users can only develop rich compilations of reputational information if they 
choose to act with the same accounts regularly.  Except for Facebook, social 
intermediaries typically permit individuals to create multiple accounts.287  Nevertheless, 
despite the privacy risks, it is reasonable to project that many users will employ the same 
accounts repeatedly.288  First, signing in with the same account repeatedly saves time.  
More importantly, the incentives offered by the reputation economy will encourage 
individuals to use the same accounts across many sites.289  Developing an account with 
strong reputational information will necessarily take time and effort.  But other users’ 
knowledge of the time and effort involved will itself signify an individual’s quality.   
 Offline, naturally-occurring transaction costs prevent us from knowing 
reputational information about the vast majority of people.  On the Social Web, it is easy 
to obtain rich information about any individuals who wish to let us know about 
                                                                                                                                            
know with certainty that I am the same person from site to site.  More than one individual might 
share a single account, or an account might be stolen.  Still, with social intermediaries, we take an 
enormous step towards the possibility of unified cross-Web identity.  
287  See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. 
288  But cf. infra Part VII.C (describing how malicious users who intend to behave 
disruptively typically choose to act under “single-shot” accounts in order to escape sanction). 
289  Reputation economy incentives also likely will encourage many users to make their 
reputational information public, notwithstanding privacy risks. 




themselves.  Mass participation in the reputation economy will be promoted by a 
combination of ease of access to reputational data, the larger quantity of such data, and 
the increased certainty about whom that data concerns.  In sum, while the reputation 
economy previously was generally available to celebrities such as Stephen Colbert and 
the Chris Anderson, “reputation riches” are now open to everyone.290   
 The result is a more efficient Web.291  Without social intermediaries, social capital 
was locked, wastefully, in individual websites.  Social intermediaries provide central 
banks for social capital and create the infrastructure necessary to allow users to transport 
reputation across sites.292  Therefore, the value of reputation development will rise.  More 
users will be motivated to leave better comments, sell more honestly, and create new 
works.  
 Just as social intermediaries benefit producers of goods and content on the Web, 
they also benefit consumers.  Purchasers of goods will be better able to tell whether they 
are buying from an honest seller or a swindler.  Similarly, content consumers will be 
better able to find material across the Web from creators whose work they enjoy.  
Moreover, social intermediaries make possible more frequent contextualization of 
information based on producer reputational data.  For example, legitimate online 
grassroots organizers can demonstrate that they are not “astroturfers” since social 
intermediaries can reveal their long histories of activism for the cause in question.   
 
 
C. Legally Protecting Social Intermediaries’ Information Value 
 
 There is the possibility that social intermediaries’ identity and reputational data 
systems could be manipulated, undermining their efficiency-creating informational 
value.293  While social intermediaries clear up much of the uncertainty over whose online 
activity is whose, they still allow people to lie about their offline characteristics.  
Individuals might misrepresent their experience, expertise, or personal histories in order 
to promote their own interests.  For instance, highly-regarded Wikipedia editor “essjay” 
bolstered his credentials on the site by falsely claiming to be a tenured university 
professor holding two doctorates.294  
 Beth Noveck writes that while traditional conceptions of identity would imply 
that online identity either “belongs” to the individual user or to the company that makes 
                                                
290  See Smarr, supra note 5 (suggesting the Social Web opens the benefits of social 
networking to the “long tail” of sites and users). 
291  See Smarr, supra note 13 (describing the Open Stack as a “classic case of removing 
inefficiency from the system”). 
292  Cf. Pluck, supra note 5, at 1–3 (analogizing social intermediaries to bridges). 
293  See generally Palfrey & Gasser, supra note 277, at 17–22 (describing how with time and 
improved technology, creating new personas has become increasingly easy). 
294  See Wikipedia, Essjay Controversy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essjay (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010). 




the identity available to others, these conceptions ignore the value of the identity to the 
community.295  She argues that trademark law, which reflects the informational value of 
marks to third parties, should inform our understanding of how to regulate online 
identity.296  We should build on Noveck’s conceptual framework to develop flexible 
protections that take into account all parties’ interests.   
 To allow users to take advantage of social intermediaries’ expansion of the value 
of reputation, the law should act to limit deceptive self-identification that is socially 
harmful.  In preventing wrongfully misleading self-identification, regulators should avoid 
prohibiting socially beneficial behavior.  This is a fine line, requiring careful balancing. 
Individuals should be free to maintain fanciful identities on social intermediaries if they 
so choose, 297 even though this can enable abusive behavior.298  Fanciful identities should 
also be encouraged, not prohibited.  Online, “[w]e can . . . create vivid, visual 
representations of personal identity . . . independent of our offline attributes.”299  For 
many users who wish to explore identity beyond the limits necessitated by the offline 
world, the availability of multiple accounts is the “feature[,] not the bug[,]” of online 
socializing.300  In some non-commercial circumstances, even intentional deceptions about 
offline identity may have social value and should not be prohibited.301  Therefore, 
regulators should focus on limiting deceptive self-identification for commercial gain.  
                                                
295  See Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: 
Creating the Legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 1733, 1738–40 (2005); see 
also Solove, supra note 21, at 33–34 (noting that reputation is socially created); Susan P. 
Crawford, Who’s In Charge of Whom I Am?  Identity and Law Online, 49 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev 
211, 213–15 (2005) (recognizing that “identity is a group project”). 
296  See Noveck, supra note 295, at 1771–79. 
297  Legal restrictions on anonymity on social intermediaries would raise serious First 
Amendment issues.  See generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 
(1995) (“[A]n author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions 
or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the 
First Amendment.”).  In an analogous context, many courts require heightened showings before 
plaintiffs can enforce subpoenas that would unmask anonymous online speakers.  See, e.g., 
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954-57 (D.C. 2009); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 
A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2009); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460-61 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. 
v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
298  See infra Part VII.C (discussing “reputation reset”). 
299  Noveck, supra note 295, at 1737. 
300  Id. at 1747–48; see also Crawford, supra note 295, at 215 (2005) (suggesting that online 
identity that is “unbundled” from offline identity “may be a concept whose time has now come”). 
301  See, e.g., Kang, supra note 16, at 1136–37, 1179–86 (describing “transmutation,” a 
strategy by which a person pretends online to be of a different ethnicity or gender, thereby 
experiencing the social treatment of a person of those characteristics); infra notes 385–386 and 
accompanying text (discussing “transmutation” further). 




Prohibiting commercial deception strikes an appropriate balance by focusing on the area 
in which deceptive behavior is most likely to be harmful to consumers without 
threatening areas in which free expression is most important.  It also falls within the law’s 
long-established role in consumer protection.302   
 Sale of social intermediary accounts should also be prohibited.  Players of online 
multi-player games sell “powerful” characters and other items to each other.303  In the 
gaming context, arguably, these transactions are harmless to third-party gamers since the 
purchasers are merely saving themselves time required to acquire enjoyable characters 
and items.  In contrast, sales of social intermediary accounts harm the public since they 
undercut the signaling function of reputation development.304  While social intermediary 
providers may prohibit account transfers through contract,305 outright prohibition of 
account sale can add government enforcement capabilities and fully account for the 
interests of third parties.   
 Regulators must also protect social identities’ informational value from social 
intermediary providers themselves.  Providers may be tempted to assert absolute 
ownership over users’ identities based on “clickwrap” agreements with users, regardless 
of the interests of users or third parties.306  Therefore, the law should also discourage 
arbitrary decisions by social intermediary providers to terminate individuals’ accounts, 
especially when individuals have invested time and effort into building their reputational 
data.307  Absolute ownership claims by social intermediaries over user data can also 
threaten privacy.308  However, the law also should not impose such rigid requirements on 
                                                
302  For instance, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 prohibits “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” and most states have statutory prohibitions against 
seller misrepresentations.  15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see Mary Dee Pridgen, Consumer Protection 
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codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0–255.5). 
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259, 261–63 (2009). 
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permission from Facebook.  See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities § 4(7), supra note 239. 
306  See Crawford, supra note 295, at 212, 219–21 (noting online multi-player gaming 
companies’ assertion of ownership over users’ accounts); Noveck, supra note 295, at 1779. 
307  See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 1198 (criticizing Facebook for arbitrarily deleting 
accounts and suggesting it should adopt a due process model).  
308  Grimmelmann argues that data ownership rights are not sufficient to protect privacy.  








D. Values Forwarded by Social Intermediaries: Culture of Respect and Access to 
Diversity of Ideas 
 
 While computer-mediated communication can dehumanize its participants by 
isolating their identities into bits and pieces,310 social intermediaries introduce some 
positive steps towards full representation of personhood.  Previously, on any given 
website, I may have appeared to be nothing more than some text or an image, and only 
my actions on that site were reflected.  In contrast, my social intermediary profile can 
reflect my cross-Web activity, my personal profile information, and my social 
connections.  My Web self begins to look more like a multi-dimensional person, with a 
variety of ideas, interests, and relationships.   
 Since dehumanization facilitates abusive behavior, the rounded expressions of 
personhood offered by social intermediaries may mitigate attacks.  A potential troll might 
realize he or she has something meaningful in common with a potential victim and decide 
not to attack.  Even if they have nothing in common, the potential attacker might still see 
in the possible victim a complete person who is worthy of respect.311  Conversely, when 
someone is victimized on the Web, social intermediaries can facilitate the spread of 
information on the victim’s plight.  As more people learn of the harm caused by 
anonymous attacks online, potential trolls may come to understand the harms that can 
flow from such behavior and be dissuaded. 
 Social intermediaries also can help overcome self-segregation online.  Cass 
Sunstein and others have expressed concern about the “echo chamber” effect of the 
Internet.312  According to this view, individuals will only visit sites with which they are 
predisposed to agree and over time become radicalized.313  Social intermediaries can 
                                                                                                                                            
See id. at 1192–95.  However, full social intermediary ownership of personal data is surely 
inimical to meaningful privacy controls for users. 
309  Cf. Zittrain, supra note 99, at 1978, 1995–96 (contending that rigid adherence to end-to-
end principles would undermine ISPs’ abilities to perform needed network maintenance). 
310  See supra Part IV.C. 
311  Social scientists have found, for instance, that racism can be diminished though 
interpersonal associations “of a sort that reveal[] enough detail about the member of the disliked 
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group characteristics.”  Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer, Groups in Contact: The 
Psychology of Desegregation 2 (1984); see also Kang, supra note 16, at 1160 n.118 (citing 
similar studies). 
312  See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 46–96; see also Putnam, supra note 37, at 177–78; 
Citron, supra note 7, at 81–82.  
313  See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 46–57. 




decrease this risk by increasing cross-cutting relationships.314  Users will carry with them 
not only “friends” from a political blog on which they participate, but “friends” from 
other sites as well.  An avid conservative might discover her friend from a gardening 
forum is a regular participant on Daily Kos, a Democratic site.315  She might see what her 
friend has posted on Daily Kos and come to learn more about an alternative viewpoint.  
She might also choose to criticize what her friend has said at Daily Kos, opening the 
possibility of dialogue.  One study found a strong correlation between Facebook usage 
and heightened “bridging” social capital, which represents ties between people from 
different groups who have loosely-connected relationships.316  By amalgamating cross-




VII. CODE-BACKED NORMS ON THE SOCIAL WEB 
 
 Just as social intermediaries act as central infrastructure for building identity and 
reputation, they also make possible a far greater role for norm development on the Web.  
No longer do norm success stories need to be limited to large individual sites such as 
eBay, Wikipedia, and Slashdot.  Since social intermediaries offer locations for 
individuals to display their cross-Web activities, they create opportunities for people to 
see, analyze, and critique each other’s actions.  By providing the incentives to use stable 
cross-Web accounts and build rich reputational data into those accounts, social 
intermediaries encourage people to take responsibility for their actions. 
 Except on Facebook, the responsibility taken may be under a pseudonymous 
identity, with no connection to offline identity. 317  “Responsible pseudonymity” may 
strike some as an oxymoron.  Citing the kinds of incidents of abuse at the social layer 
discussed supra, some leading cyberlaw scholars have suggested we require “traceable 
anonymity,” by which websites would be obligated to record the IP addresses of their 
visitors.318  In contrast to “traceable anonymity,” as well as Lior Strahilevitz’s How’s My 
                                                
314  Cf. Kang, supra note 16, at 1166–69 (arguing that in contrast to racially segregated 
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317  See Kumayama, supra note 9, at 442–44 (contrasting anonymity, in which no 
information related to identity is transmitted, with pseudonymity, which by providing an attached 
name offers “the ability to accrue reputational capital”). 
318  See Solove, supra note 21, at 146–47; Citron, supra note 7, at 123 (advocating requiring 
website operators to collect and retain visitors’ IP addresses); Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the 
Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the 
Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 991, 1031–35 
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Driving? system, the “responsible pseudonymity” encouraged by social intermediaries is 
not mandatory.  Nevertheless, the Social Web will shift the status quo toward 
responsibility, paving the way for additional norm development.319 
 This Part describes the mechanisms for development of code-backed norms on the 
Social Web.  It first describes “reputation scores,” which can play a special role in the 
development of norms.  It then reviews how code-backed norms are developed through 
social intermediaries, with focus in turn on the roles of social intermediary providers, site 
operators, and end-users.  In reviewing these roles, this Part analyzes some of the legal 
implications of the roles these norm developers play.  It next argues that the possibility of 
“reputation reset” will not undermine norm development.  Finally, it contends that the 
emerging Social Web overcomes the arguments of Neil Netanel and others that the Web 
is fundamentally inhospitable to norms.   
 
 
A. Reputation Scores: Quantified Norms  
 
 The prior Part discussed how social intermediaries help users build reputations by 
amalgamating information on their cross-Web activities, personal histories, and 
interactions with others.  These qualitative details are similar to the kinds of information 
we use in our offline lives to form ideas about people.  Social intermediaries can also 
calculate reputation according to numerical algorithms, producing “reputation scores.”320  
Disqus’s clout system and IntenseDebate’s reputation points are examples of reputation 
scores.  Reputation scores can be expressed as a single number, as on Disqus or 
IntenseDebate, or by a series of numbers representing different traits, as on Slashdot.321  
These numbers do not merely inform a judgment by others; they represent a quantified, 
scaled reputation.  They have no offline analogue in informal, day-to-day interactions.  
Their closest offline cousin might be credit scores.322 
                                                
319  “Pseudonymous responsibility” and “traceable anonymity” are not exclusive, and could 
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Slashdot’s karma system.  Nevertheless, for simplicity, I will describe reputation scores as 
numbers. 
322  See Noveck, supra note 295, at 1767, 1782 (analogizing legal protections for credit 
scores to legal protections for online reputations). 




 Reputation scores could also be called quantified norms.  All reputation score 
formats discussed previously in this Article are based, at least in part, on user voting.  
Each vote cast is an expression of what that voter values.  Reputation scores, added 
together across many voters, represent bottom-up group definitions of what behavior is 
socially valued.323  For instance, when moderators on Slashdot choose to rate others on 
whether they are “insightful,” they express their judgments about what kind of posts add 
insight.  Compiled across many votes and many users, these ratings form a powerful 
group definition of what constitutes insightful comments.   
 Will enough people vote to make reputation scores meaningful?  I believe so.  
First, unlike voting at a ballot box, voting on a reputation score requires only a few 
clicks.  Those who frequent a particular site might find it worth their effort to try to 
improve the quality of user behavior there.  Emotions can also drive rating behavior.  In 
How’s My Driving?, Lior Strahilevitz contends that drivers would feel emotional 
satisfaction from telephoning a central hub to criticize (or praise) other drivers.324  
Moreover, social intermediaries and site operators can increase rating behavior by 
fostering an atmosphere that promotes a sense of community and represents rating as pro-
community behavior.325 
 While reputation scores could exist without social intermediaries, they have been 
impractical for most sites.  Without the data points provided by cross-Web activity, any 
reputation score calculated by a single site would be of low value unless the site was 
extraordinarily popular.  Further, without the assistance provided by social 
intermediaries, building a system to calculate reputation scores would require too much 
programming skill for many site operators. 
 Reputation scores can be attached as “metadata” to user identities, immediately 
available to be read by a site’s software upon a user’s login.  Of course, software cannot 
understand all of the nuance behind a reputation score and cannot understand if a 
particular metric calculates something of value.  But a computer can recognize the 
relative value of a given score within a metric.  This makes reputation scores importantly 
different from conventional offline reputations.  Just as social intermediaries provide a 
central bank for social capital on the Web, reputation scores can become a reputational 
currency.  The easy availability of reputation scores enabled by social intermediaries 
opens the door to low-effort moderation methods not previously available.  These 
methods are discussed infra Part VII.B.2.  
 Unfortunately, social intermediary providers do not reveal their reputation score 
formulas.  Providers should disclose how their reputation scores are calculated, both to 
maximize the scores’ usefulness and to ensure fairness.  Continued secrecy could fuel 
concerns that social intermediary providers might manipulate reputation scores to serve 
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their own ends.  While disclosure may not be sufficient to protect consumers,326 it is a 
valuable first step.327  Beth Noveck suggests that reputation providers may lack 
incentives to disclose their algorithms.328  If she is correct, then legally mandated 
disclosure will be necessary.329 
 Reputation score systems should be developed towards providing more nuanced 
information.  The reputation scores generated on Disqus and IntenseDebate are based 
only on a simple thumbs up/down system, in contrast to Slashdot’s multi-factor system.  
In a commercial setting like eBay, it is fairly clear what a simple “thumbs up” means—
good product, timely delivery or payment, etc.330  However, in many contexts simple 
popular voting cannot provide useful information since values are too varied.331  Lior 
Strahilevitz offers the example of art, in which what is popular among connoisseurs often 
does not correlate to what is more widely popular.332 
 Fortunately, this limitation is not likely to be permanent.  As social intermediaries 
become more popular and more voters cast their views in reputation score system, social 
intermediary providers will be able to implement multi-factor rating methods akin to 
Slashdot’s.  So long as users are not forced to cast too complicated a vote, such a system 
would add a negligible cost in additional effort for each rater while adding a wealth of 
valuable norm-building information.   
 One could even imagine a “Reputation Score 2.0” system in which users are able 
to define the very characteristics that would form the basis of their votes.333  Rather than 
selecting from a drop-down list of pre-set characteristics, users could choose to 
categorize their ratings themselves.  Social intermediary providers could also offer many 
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different reputation score applets, giving users choices that calculate according to 
different metrics.  Additionally, one could imagine social intermediaries adding systems 
to provide information on the context in which votes are cast.  For example, very 
different considerations likely drive a positive rating at a forum concerning scholarly 
scientific developments compared to a rating at an irreverent humor site. 
 
 
B. Sources of Norm Development and Legal Consequences 
 
 Norms on the Social Web, like those on Wikipedia, eBay, and Slashdot, will be 
based on an interplay between site users and the suppliers of the norm-enabling code.  By 
adding social intermediary providers as a new player in addition to users and site 
operators, social intermediaries add a new layer of complexity to the development of 
code-backed norms.  This Sub-Part will review the role of social intermediary providers, 
site operators, and users in building norms on the Social Web.  In doing so, it will address 
notable legal aspects of these players’ roles in norm development. 
 
 
1.   Social Intermediary Providers 
 
 Social intermediary providers like Google and Facebook create the infrastructure 
necessary for cross-Web norms to develop.  In doing so, they define the scope of what is 
possible on their systems.334  Since they can define what activity is in-bounds or out-of-
bounds for users and site operators, social intermediary providers can potentially exercise 
significant power over norms. 
 While Lior Strahilevitz warns against using law to enforce norms that are not 
universally held,335 market and technical enforcement of non-universal norms is also 
perilous.  In a competitive market, site operators will be able to select social 
intermediaries that provide features that best reflect their goals, and users will be able to 
frequent sites with features they prefer.  However, as networked goods, social 
intermediaries tend towards de facto standardization.  If a social intermediary gains a 
large market share, it might attempt to “lock in” users.  Social intermediary providers that 
have large user bases have incentives to prevent easy account transfer.336  Randal Picker 
notes that competitors to powerful identity sources are motivated to lower switching 
costs.337  As Picker would predict, upstart social intermediary providers, such as JS-Kit 
and Pluck, offer tools to allow users to connect account from multiple providers, enabling 
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a form of reputational data transfer.338  Yet a sufficiently powerful social intermediary 
provider might use its terms of service, as well as technical controls, to prevent third-
parties from facilitating easy switching.339  Lock-in harms norm development because 
users become stuck into a limiting social architecture.  Rather than liberating users to 
develop new modes of social governance, a powerful social intermediary with locked-in 
users becomes a constraining force.  
 Randy Picker has called for antitrust monitoring to protect account transfer in 
situations analogous to the one presented by social intermediaries.340  While antitrust is 
primarily a tool of economic policy, free speech values support protection against lock-in 
because social intermediaries exercise significant control over how users identify and 
express themselves.  In today’s competitive environment, I have argued that the arrival of 
social intermediaries obviates the need for property-like protections for reputation 
portability on the Web.  However, if as time passes a single social intermediary provider 
gains sufficient market power to lock in users, legal reputation portability protection may 
become truly necessary.   
 Social intermediaries can take good faith steps to assuage concerns about their 
potential power.  First, they should take a general attitude of openness with regard to their 
norm-affecting features.  They should disclose what behavior is off-limits on their 
systems and why they have made those decisions.  Second, they should readily accept 
third-party applets.  So long as third-party programmers can add features, social 
intermediary providers do not unilaterally limit the horizons of socializing within their 
systems.  Tight control of third-party applets would undercut the ability for social 
intermediaries to generate new social structures.341  Some deletions of applets that harm 
network functionality or threaten to violate users’ privacy will be necessary.  Therefore, 
social intermediaries should disclose the basic standards to which third-party applets 
must conform, and only delete applets that violate those basic standards.342  Third, they 
should not prohibit users from taking their reputational information contained in their 
accounts to other social intermediary providers, nor should they use technical or legal 
means to block third-party programs that give users easy technical means to do so.  By 
taking these steps, providers can offer assurance that they intend to protect norm 
development from the damaging effects of lock-in. 
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2.   Site Operators 
 
 Social intermediaries provide site operators strong, flexible tools for moderation.  
As moderators, site operators can play a significant role in norm development.  Without 
social intermediaries, almost all moderation must be ex post, meaning taken with 
reference to a specific user action.  Social intermediaries enhance the power of ex post 
methods by enabling site operators to praise or sanction users with an audience that 
reaches beyond the operator’s particular site.  If a site operator deletes a user’s comment 
from his or her site, that deletion could be reflected in the user’s history.  On the other 
hand, if the site operator appreciates a user’s contribution, he or she can say so in the 
user’s profile. 
 By creating portable reputation scores, social intermediaries facilitate ex ante 
moderation—moderation without reference to a specific user action.343  Slashdot’s 
moderation methods could be used on any site, without the need to build a large user base 
and without the need for dedicated moderators.  For instance, site operators can establish 
limits on who can act on their sites by requiring users to meet a designated reputation 
score threshold before they can participate.  As a softer approach, site operators could 
follow Slashdot by giving more prominence to the actions of users with better 
reputations.  Also like Slashdot, they could provide individual users control over how 
other users’ reputations affect the display of their user-generated content. 
 The ease of moderation enabled by social intermediaries has implications for the 
debate over § 230 reform.  Any reduction in § 230 immunity would raise the cost of 
owning a site because operators would be forced to either engage in greater moderation 
or risk liability.  By lowering the cost of moderation, social intermediaries reduce the 
burden that diminished immunity imposes on site operators.344  Nevertheless, immunity 
should never depend upon engaging in ex ante moderation.  Private ex ante moderation in 
a competitive marketplace can improve online discourse while leaving open ample 
opportunities to speak.  However, any government encouragement for such moderation 
violates First Amendment protections against prior restraints345 and may violate 
procedural due process requirements.346  
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speech, for example through direct prohibition, but not when the state hampers speech indirectly, 
for example by firing a university faculty member). 






3.   Elite Users 
 
 In The Future of the Internet, Jonathan Zittrain writes about how “elite users” on 
some sites play an important role in site governance.347  These elites are typically 
frequent, emotionally-invested users of a particular site.  Zittrain praises the role of elite 
users, writing that they are invaluable in the development of successful participatory 
sites.348  Like Wikipedia’s administrators and Slashdot’s editors, elite users sometimes 
receive from site operators semi-official status and special powers.349  For popular sites, 
the value of elite users as liaisons between operators and typical users is apparent:  the 
ratio of users to site operators becomes too high for them to moderate without help.  One 
solution is to rely on trusted delegates.  While social intermediaries ease moderation, they 
also promote participation.  As a result, more sites may choose to deputize elite users.   
 
 
4.   Ordinary Users 
 
 Norm development on the Social Web will, at bottom, be driven by ordinary 
users.  Social intermediaries are designed to allow more sites to incorporate user 
participation and to give users more abilities as they participate.  In reputation score 
systems, even where social intermediary services offer some guidance on how to vote, 
the votes themselves are a reflection of the judgments of ordinary users.  Ordinary users 
are the means to and the purpose of the Social Web, and they are the reason the multi-
layered system of “regulation” it engenders can be called a system of norms. 
 While norms on the non-intermediated Web are concentrated in individual sites, 
social intermediaries introduce a second key location for norm growth:  “friend” 
communities.  On social intermediaries, clusters of “friends” meet most of the definition 
of “tight-knit communities” in which norms can grow.350  They are repeat players since 
they can access each other’s profiles readily, so information related to control flows 
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easily.  Socializing online may also be more democratic and less hierarchical than 
offline.351  Therefore, “friend” communities, in addition to individual sites, will be 
centers of norm development. 
 
 
C. Reputation Reset, Trolls, and Norm Development 
 
 On social intermediaries, individuals can engage in “reputation reset,” abandoning 
accounts with poor reputations freely.  This Sub-Part explains reputation reset and how it 
can assist vigilant individuals in overcoming online embarrassment.  It also shows how 
reputation reset appears to threaten norm development on the Web by facilitating trolls.  
Nevertheless it contends that social intermediaries provide important context to the 
actions of users who lack reputations by which the harm from trolls can be minimized.  
  
 
1.   Reset Switch Explained 
 
 The biggest challenges for norm development on the Web are the need for a high 
degree of conformity and the freedom of movement online.  If users receive criticism or 
disapprobation, they can simply abandon the accounts to which the critiques are 
attached.352  As when playing a video game, an individual can hit the reset switch on his 
or her online identity and begin anew.  This “reputation reset” undermines the value of 
social sanctions.  As Lior Strahilevitz states, “[o]nline reputation sites suffer somewhat 
because users with poor reputations can always ‘flush’ their existing identities and start 
over with a blank slate.”353 
 Not every individual who suffers criticism on social intermediaries will engage in 
reputation reset.  Some people welcome controversy or are indifferent to criticism.  Other 
users, however, will be hesitant to abandon accounts in which they have invested 
substantial energy to build socially and economically valuable reputational data.354  For 
users who have built communities of “friends” in conjunction with an account, 
abandoning such connections entails real social and emotional costs.355  Even online 
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norm skeptics Netanel and Lemley admit that leaving online communities can be 
difficult.356  The cross-Web nature of communities on social intermediaries only 
heightens online friendships’ value and raises the cost of account abandonment.  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that users are free to engage in reputation reset, with friend 
clusters and sacrificed reputation only sometimes serving as a deterrent. 
 The bright side of reputation reset is that it can provide privacy protection for 
careful users.  Jonathan Zittrain suggests the need for “reputation bankruptcy,” by which 
users can start over in terms of their reputations online.357  On social intermediaries, 
people who have been subjected to humiliation or persistent criticism can abandon the 
accounts under scrutiny.  However, when users employ the same account repeatedly, 
“reputation bankruptcy” requires special vigilance.  Complete reputation bankruptcy can 
be achieved with certainty only if users act totally pseudonymously, having never 
publicly divulged any offline personal information in connection with the abandoned 
account.358  Most individuals are not so careful, nor do they want to be.359  Therefore, 
many users will be unable to attain the kind of thorough “reputation bankruptcy” 
envisioned by Zittrain.360 
 
 
2.   The Threat to Norms 
 
 While the reset switch offers privacy protection to hyper-vigilant individuals, it 
also facilitates intentional wrongdoers.  In other words, it feeds the trolls.  People could 
intentionally create “single-shot” accounts that they intend to use only once or a few 
times to engage in what they know to be malicious behavior. In this kind of situation, the 
troll would not be surprised by subsequent criticism.  Instead, the troll engages in what he 
or she knows to be widely condemned behavior and then avoids social sanctions by 
                                                                                                                                            
employed email services supplied by their ISPs, leaving an ISP meant leaving behind an identity 
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356  See Lemley, supra note 110, at 1269 n.55; Netanel, supra note 65, at 426.  
357  See Zittrain, supra note 2, at 228–29.  I use “reputation reset” instead of “reputation 
bankruptcy” because Zittrain’s term sweeps more broadly than mine.   
358  See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 1193–94 (explaining that portable identity 
heightens the risks of divulging any private information in connection with an account because 
data is subject to the privacy protections of the least secure site at which the user employs the 
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359  See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 1151–64. 
360  Cf. Kumayama, supra note 9, at 428–29, 446–48 (offering more optimistic account of 
the privacy-protecting value of pseudonymity online).   




abandoning the account used.  While such trolling was equally possible without social 
intermediaries, it appears that social intermediaries fail to offer deterrence.  
 The above analysis might appear to undermine one of my central claims—that 
social intermediaries will pave the way to a new age of norms on the Web.  One might 
concede that social intermediaries will produce an uptick in socially-approved behavior, 
but still argue that reputation reset means that there will be no change in the Web’s ugly 
underbelly.  Given the need for a high degree of compliance for norm maintenance, trolls 
appear to threaten the bright future of social governance I describe.   
Worse, recall Danielle Citron’s concern about the aggregating nature of 
destructive mobs on the Web.361  One might worry that just as social networks assisted 
flash mobs in congregating for attack, social intermediaries will only make the problem 
worse by paving a direct path from the social network to the site or person to be attacked.   
 
 
3.   Solutions: Contextualization, Ex Ante Moderation, and Social Filtering 
 
 Fortunately, thanks to social intermediaries, trolls will no longer look like 
everyone else.  Without social intermediaries, there has been no ex ante way to 
distinguish a troll from other users.  Operators of sites open to public use have been 
forced to wait for people to act and then decide whether to intervene ex post.  When 
swarms of trolls arrive, the damage has often been done before the problem is detected. 
 With social intermediaries, as discussed supra, responsible users will have 
incentives to develop positive reputations on their profiles.  In contrast, it is easiest for 
trolls to act with single-shot accounts.362  The very fact that a person has no history will 
be an important data point that will immediately make a user suspect.  A user’s lack of 
history can put his or her actions in context.363 
 Contextualization, by itself, is insufficient to eliminate all harms.364  Fortunately, 
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the moderation abilities provided by social intermediaries can facilitate responsible site 
operators in minimizing trolls’ harmful impact.  Site operators can engage in ex ante 
moderation to prevent individuals lacking in reputation from acting on their sites.  They 
can also employ tools to make it especially easy to engage in ex post moderation of the 
behavior of such users.   
 Additionally, one could imagine Web consumers employing social intermediaries 
to engage in “social filtering.”  David Johnson, Susan Crawford, and John Palfrey suggest 
that while the presumption online has been to accept all content, we might move to a 
world where people only accept content that comes from trusted sources.365  While they 
propose infrastructure-layer verified identity systems as the mechanism for this 
change,366 social intermediaries enable the same type of “social filtering.”367  It is 
possible to imagine social intermediaries configured so that people can browse through 
them and accept content only from approved friends or others with established, positive 
reputations.  In doing so, individuals could mimic ex ante site moderation.   
 The downside of these approaches is that they punish those who simply are new 
to an account or who engage in the more salutary forms of reputation bankruptcy.  
However, not all sites and users will employ social filtering, so new users should have 
ample opportunities to express themselves and build positive reputations.368  Just as 
Wikipedia’s “flagged revisions” approach leaves individuals free to move up the ranks of 
editors,369 the “probation period” made possible by social intermediaries can represent a 
compromise between unfettered speech and limiting trolls. 
 In sum, on sites with social intermediaries, trolls stand out.  While 
contextualization and moderation cannot prevent all intentionally abusive behavior, they 
should succeed in limiting disruptive behavior sufficiently to enable norms to grow. 
 
 
D. Conclusion: Rethinking “the Classic Counter-Example” 
 
 It is time to rethink Neil Netanel’s assertion that the Web is the “classic counter-
example” to the type of environment in which norms can shape behavior.370  The Social 
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Web alters many of the assumptions under which he and others evaluated the Web’s 
capacity for private ordering.   
 First, the Web is no longer simply too big to handle norms.  Social intermediaries 
enable the formation of smaller “friend” communities, which represent localities of 
manageable size where norms can develop.  Moreover, thanks to social intermediaries, 
norms scale more easily.  Rather than relying on the same haphazard mechanisms for 
spreading reputation and norms that we use offline, social intermediaries make 
reputation- and norm-building information easy to acquire and develop. 
 Second, social intermediaries also help overcome the high cost of norm creation 
and enforcement.  Norm creation on social intermediaries, largely left to individual users, 
can be as simple as voting on a reputation score or posting an approving or disapproving 
wall message.  Social intermediaries greatly reduce the cost of moderation for site 
operators, both through ex post and ex ante methods.  In coming years, social 
intermediaries may also facilitate site operators in giving special authority to elite users, 
who can act as models and guides for fellow users.  Finally, by spreading norm-building 
information, social intermediaries also allow individual users to choose to enforce norms 
through purchases and sales, praise or criticism, and friendship or distrust.   
 Third, social intermediaries facilitate efforts to ensure high compliance with 
norms.  By placing trolls in context as low-value contributors, efforts to block and 
contextualize their actions become easier.  Responsible contributors will be less likely to 
be scared away by disruptive behavior.   
 What will the content of norms on the Social Web be?  In some contexts, it is 
relatively easy to predict.  For example, on auction sites such as eBay and yellow pages-
style sites such as Craigslist, norms will mirror conventional values in commercial 
settings:  Timely payment and quality goods will earn favor, while the opposite will earn 
scorn.  In most other contexts, it would be foolhardy to predict the norms that will 
develop.371  Too many varied norms will emerge to be refined into a simple set of 
predictions.372  The multiplicity of norms reflects the multiplicity of human values, and as 
such should be seen as a net positive.   
 
 
VIII. UGLY SIDE OF THE SOCIAL WEB 
 
 Although the growth of norms generally should be welcome as facilitating low-
cost social solutions to social problems, it also has an ugly side.  As Stanley Milgram’s 
experiments illustrate, social forces can produce cruelty and mistreatment.  This Part 
explores problems that may arise from the expansion of norms on the Web.  It first 
addresses the threat posed by communities that foster anti-social, destructive norms.  It 
then discusses the possibility that portable identity will expand the prevalence of 
invidious discrimination.  Finally, it discusses the dangers of over-enforcement of 
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otherwise-salutary norms.  While social intermediaries invite these problems by 
expanding the role of norms on the Web, this Part also explores their capacity for 
mitigating the dangers posed. 
 
 
A. Harmful Norms 
 
 Even taking into account the diversity of human values, there are some norms that 
it is widely agreed are socially damaging, such as norms that promote wanton violence or 
cruelty.  There will be communities on the Social Web, as there are offline, where 
destructive values will be promoted.373  Online communities of wrongdoers can 
congregate on unmoderated sites.  To reduce the chance of accidentally rendering 
themselves traceable, they could also form, as they do now, on sites that do not use social 
intermediaries.374  Some sites might even use moderation methods to foster communities 
with these destructive tendencies.375   
 It is undeniable that destructive norm-communities will emerge.  The Social Web 
is not a panacea.  Accordingly, the emergence of social intermediaries should not mark an 
end to efforts at targeted regulation.  When the risk of harm is sufficient, and where 
regulation is consistent with First Amendment legal requirements and values, we should 
continue to explore the possibilities of new legal solutions to problems at the Web’s 
social layer.376   
 However, there are several reasons for optimism—reasons to believe that most 
norm-communities that develop on the Social Web will not be destructive.  First, 
admittedly informal empirical evidence seems to indicate that code-backed norms on the 
Web have primarily been a positive force.  Norms play a positive role on sites like 
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Wikipedia, eBay, and Slashdot.  These success stories should give us pause before we 
form too many pessimistic assumptions about the potential prevalence of destructive 
norms on the Web.  Second, social intermediaries give responsible site operators the 
facilities to eliminate a significant amount of the damage done by aggregated mobs ex 
post.  Third, I have argued that while trolls are ex ante indistinguishable from other users 
on the non-intermediated Web, trolls who act under single-shot accounts on the Social 
Web will appear relatively suspect.  If I am correct, then well-meaning Web users will be 
primed to give their outbursts less attention and less credibility. Fourth, if David Johnson, 
Susan Crawford, and John Palfrey are correct in asserting that many individuals will turn 
to social filtering and view only trusted material,377 the reach of mobs of trolls will be 
sharply limited.  Finally, I have argued that the net effect of social intermediaries will be 
to create greater feelings that others on the Web are genuinely “people” and worthy of 
respect.378  Though there surely will be antisocial norm-communities, the possibility of 
more fully rounded identities shining through on the Web can mitigate their influence. 
 
 
B. Status-Based Discrimination 
 
 As discussed supra, discrimination is a serious problem online.379  While social 
intermediaries enable cross-Web identity and norm-development, those same features 
create the risk of increased status-based discrimination.380  By identifying themselves 
according to their offline characteristics, members of traditionally discriminated-against 
groups risk discrimination online.  Moreover, as Lior Strahilevitz states, “majoritarian 
norms may unduly reflect stubborn biases, like racial, gender, or religious animus.”381  
 Further, ex ante moderation, which can bar access to sites or create tiered access, 
may make it harder to determine who is responsible for discrimination.  Forbidding 
access to a person who self-identifies as a minority on that basis alone clearly would 
violate a cyber-equivalent to Title II of the Civil Rights Act,382 which forbids 
discrimination in access to places of public accommodation on the bases of race, color, 
religion, or national origin.383  Yet situations can be far more complicated.  For instance, 
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imagine site operators who, without subjective discriminatory intent, bar people with low 
reputation scores from acting on their site.  If a minority user’s low reputation score can 
be traced clearly to the discriminatory intent of rating voters, what is the site operator’s 
culpability in barring that user from his or her site?  Who is culpable if, instead, there is 
ambiguity in the degree to which the low rating is influenced by discriminatory intent?  
 Despite these dangers, social intermediaries provide opportunities to reduce the 
prevalence of status-based discrimination on the Web.  In his article Cyber-Race, Jerry 
Kang describes three strategies for overcoming racial (and by extension, other forms of) 
discrimination.384  He terms these strategies “abolition,” “integration,” and 
“transmutation.”385  By “abolition,” Kang means a strategy of hiding race through 
anonymity.386  Kang expresses skepticism about “abolition” as a general approach, 
criticizing it as naive, potentially burdensome on minorities, and doomed by the new (in 
2000) emergence of broadband multimedia capabilities.387  By providing a means for 
cross-Web multi-media representations of self, social intermediaries continue to 
undermine “abolition” as a full-scale strategy to combat discrimination online.  However, 
Kang contends that “abolition” is useful in marketplace settings because those who are 
concerned about discrimination offline can buy and sell in cyberspace, free of that risk.388  
Kang suggests that this solution might be feasible only if rating agencies are formed to 
assess the reliability of all online transactors; otherwise, he fears anonymous cyberspace 
exchanges cannot match the kinds of risk-assessment that are possible offline.389  Social 
intermediaries, as discussed supra, provide the facilities for the risk-assessment that Kang 
desires without requiring the creation of invasive rating bodies.390   
 Kang is optimistic about the “integration” strategy, and he suggests that 
cyberspace can increase both the quantity and quality of cross-race interactions.391  Social 
                                                                                                                                            
(2002) (contending that websites are places of public accommodation within the meaning of 
existing Civil Rights Act law). 
384  See Kang, supra note 16, at 1136–37. 
385  See id. 
386  See id. at 1136, 1154–59; see also Putnam, supra note 37, at 172–73 (describing a study 
showing that as compared to offline, women are less likely to be ignored in online discussions, at 
least where they hide their gender).  Kang sees “abolition” as appealing to those who see racism 
as inescapable and to those who see color-blindness as the best solution to racism.  See Kang, 
supra note 16, at 1136. 
387  See Kang, supra note 16, at 1156, 1158. 
388  See id. at 1188–89. 
389  See id. at 1191–92.  
390  Cf. id. at 1190–92 (suggesting that methods would be needed to protect individuals’ 
privacy from third-party rating services). 
391  See id. at 1136, 1160–79. 




intermediaries advance several of the factors Kang highlights from social science 
literature as being important to succeeding with an “integration” strategy.392  Social 
intermediaries provide opportunities to encounter “disconfirming data” about previously 
unknown others that might dispel negative stereotypes.  They also offer substantial 
opportunities for cooperation, for instance in improving and governing discussion 
forums.  Additionally, their “friending” features allow for non-superficial contact among 
individuals of varying backgrounds.393   
 Kang’s third strategy, “transmutation,” involves individuals pseudonymously 
“passing” as members of different racial or gender groups.394  The goal of 
“transmutation” is to allow the “passing” individuals to understand the experiences of 
those in the group they imitate and to learn that identity is distinct from immutable 
characteristics.395  Most social intermediaries enhance the “transmutation” strategy by 
allowing individuals to express pretend characteristics on multiple websites easily.   
 Ultimately, social intermediaries bear a complex relationship to status-based 
discrimination.  While they raise the risks of the kinds of discrimination about which 
Danielle Citron and others rightly worry, they also provide opportunities to escape offline 
discrimination and to promote inter-group understanding.  As with other problems at the 
social layer explored above, the lesson may be that social intermediaries provide new 
avenues for abuse by the malicious few while assisting the good-faith many—that is, they 
may offer new avenues for abuse by hardened bigots while assisting most Web users, 
who act in good-faith, in gaining new understandings of others in society.  
 
 
C. Over-Enforcement of Norms 
 
 Finally, social intermediaries risk inviting over-enforcement of otherwise valuable 
norms.396  While many norms are socially beneficial, excessive punishment for their 
violation is not.  Just as we would not want to impose life imprisonment for a parking 
offense, we do not want someone who commits a minor social infraction to be subject to 
abject humiliation.  By providing ready access to venues to criticize others’ actions, 
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social intermediaries make it easier for over-enforcement of norms to occur.  Tidal waves 
of criticism need not come from coordinated mobs of malicious attackers, as described by 
Danielle Citron.  Even well-meaning individuals, acting independently, can also over-
enforce norms. 
 This problem has already manifested without the assistance of social 
intermediaries.  Daniel Solove describes the story of “dog poop girl,” a South Korean 
student who failed to clean up her dog’s feces from a subway train when asked to do 
so.397  A popular South Korean blog posted a video of the incident, which was then re-
publicized in major media outlets around the world.398  “Dog poop girl,” faced with an 
overwhelming level of criticism, dropped out of her university.399  
 What “dog poop girl” did was wrong, but she did not deserve the scale of 
punishment she received.  Yet it is hard to say that any individual blog, Web user, or 
news agency that spread the story and criticized the woman is to blame.  How can we 
avoid a massive increase in these kinds of problems on the Social Web? 
 There are some steps social intermediary providers can take to reduce the chances 
of a criticism overload.  For instance, they could institute “reputation freezes,” similar to 
stock exchanges’ “circuit breakers.”  A “circuit breaker” on a stock exchange halts 
trading for a period following a massive decline in index values.400  Similarly, social 
intermediary providers might automatically prevent more criticism if a user has received 
too many negative reputation score votes and critical profile comments within a specified 
time period.   
 Existing social intermediary features might also assist individuals in overcoming 
floods of criticism.  First, reputation reset, combined with pseudonymity, can protect 
careful users of social intermediaries.  However, if offline identifying data is connected to 
the shaming, as in the case above, this solution will not be sufficient.  Second, social 
intermediaries can assist individuals by providing them with a central location from 
which to respond to criticism.  Jonathan Zittrain believes that in the future the most 
reliable solutions to privacy problems will be those that depend upon “more, not less, 
information.”401  He suggests that contextualization of information can help overcome 
online humiliation.402  If he is correct, then social intermediaries can represent an 
improvement by providing a widely-recognized center of identity from which people can 
reply to criticism and embarrassing information.   
 Despite these potential mitigating forces, some people will see a need for 
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increased legal and technical privacy protection in response to possibility of over-
enforcement of norms.  The conversation about the tension between privacy and 





 Social intermediaries represent a substantial step toward a more responsible Web.  
Through social intermediaries, people can maintain consistent identities across many 
websites. These new application-layer systems for portable identity will mean that social 
forces can shape behavior on the Web far more than was previously possible.  Social 
intermediaries also make it possible for users to aggregate reputational information 
developed from across the Web.  Because Web reputations will be easier to build and 
more valuable, many more users will be motivated to engage in socially valued behavior 
so that they can earn the benefits of the emerging reputation economy.  Websites will be 
able to open the door to user participation more easily and more flexibly, without fear of 
inviting only a “flame-ridden cacophony.”403 
 Social intermediaries provide the “social glue” that can enable the Web to become 
a place of robust, contextual, multi-faceted norms.  Social intermediaries promote an 
atmosphere in which people recognize each other as fully rounded individuals who are 
worthy of respect.  In the absence of legal protections online, social intermediaries 
facilitate bottom-up responses to problems at the Web’s social layer.  When the norms 
that emerge fail to curb social-layer problems sufficiently, we should consider regulatory 
responses.404  Nevertheless, the new possibility of social solutions should at least give us 
pause before we adopt Danielle Citron’s “aggressive pro-regulatory posture.”405   
 While offering an alternative to legal responses to social-layer problems, social 
intermediaries also introduce novel regulatory challenges.  In considering whether to 
create new privacy baselines, regulators should aim to leave users free to take full 
advantage of the opportunities for reputation-building and accountability afforded by 
social intermediaries, while considering how best to protect them from being pushed into 
ceding privacy without their understanding and consent.  Insofar as these goals are in 
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tension, further discussion will be needed on the correct balance between privacy and 
accountability.  Social intermediaries also introduce a host of regulatory challenges 
unrelated to privacy, including issues of commercial honesty, market power, antisocial 
group formation, discrimination, and over-enforcement of norms. 
 Portable identity has arrived without legal mandates or changes to the Internet’s 
core architecture.  Social intermediaries undercut the assumption that the Web is by 
nature inhospitable to norms.  Which of our fundamental beliefs about the Web’s social 
structures will be shaken tomorrow?  Regulation of the Web must, as best as possible, 
account for its mutable nature.   
